

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT


AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Metro Park Springfield, VA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/27	3. TIME 1024 hrs	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS 02	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 229TH MP Co, VA National Guard, Virginia Beach, VA			

9. [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH.

[REDACTED] was assigned to Abu Ghraib (AG) from 18 Aug 2003 until 12 Mar 2004. I was a MP Platoon Leader and primarily responsible for the Internal Reaction Force (IRF) which provided a quick reaction capability for the AG complex. Part of our orientation and training for the deployment included training on the Geneva Convention, but there was no training on what the duties would be of MI personnel interrogating detainees. Part of my in processing at AG involved an orientation tour of the complex. I made a "leader's recon" after than and met for a short time with [REDACTED] but did not really get into specifics of MP interface with MI interrogation operations. For the most part MPs and MI kept apart; there was some sense among the e MPs that most of the MI folks were not pulling their fare share around the facility. I had Navy dog handlers attached to my unit, but they were used for MP operations not related to interrogation operations. After I returned to AG from Thanksgiving leave, two Army dog handlers were assigned to the facility [REDACTED]. I don't know their first names, but believed they came from Ft Bragg. Both wanted nothing to do with duties associated with MP operations and the IRF. They worked with MI but I don't know what they did, or about the use of dogs in interrogations. Other than what I reported to the Taguba Panel, I did not see or become aware of any abuse or humiliation of detainees. I did not see or become aware of any unauthorized photographs of detainees. I had informed my Soldiers as to how we were to work and if they observed or became aware of any unauthorized activity they should report it to me immediately. Q: Is there anything you wish to add? A: No [REDACTED]

END OF STATEMENT



10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF [REDACTED] PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

AG0000477

DOD 000565

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/05/27

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

[REDACTED]

A.I.T

USF&

AFFIDAVIT

[REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of May 2004 at

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

On 10 February 2004, a team of officers, at the direction of Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

[REDACTED] MP, CFCC - PMO, Interviewer
[REDACTED] JA, CFLCC - SJA, Interviewer
[REDACTED] 705th MP Battalion, Interviewer
[REDACTED] 229th MP Company, Respondent

The interview is summarized as follows:

My name is [REDACTED]. I'm a First Lieutenant with the 229th MP Company, Virginia Army National Guard, currently located at the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility at Abu Gharib. My social security number is [REDACTED]. I'm in charge of 3rd Platoon, and we've been tasked to organize at Abu Gharib. Our mission is to run the Internal Reaction Force, and to provide escort guards within the confines of the facility. I enlisted in 1985. I was infantry active duty for 3 years. After an 11-year break in service, I went to the National Guard, and to OCS. I've been with the 229th MP Company, since 2001.

My commander is [REDACTED]. We've been at the BCCF, since August 2003. I was TDY in Saudi Arabia, prior to that. The rest of my company was at Camp Doha, Kuwait.

We did some confinement training, at the MOB Station. It was anticipated, that we would have that mission when we arrived. We did customs when we arrived, but our mission at the prison is pretty much a no-brainer.

It seems, being a National Guard Company, we do a lot of things on our own, when we should have more help from the battalions. A lot of questions we've had, pertaining to movement, I've had to go outside the chain.

Our living conditions aren't that bad. We have a hard roof, over our heads, MRE's, and water, so I can't complain.

We are way short of personnel. When we're short, we suck it up, and work longer hours. I'm in charge of the Internal Reaction Force. I've got 10 guys that are on call 24 hours a day. Since I have 2 missions, I've been able to sacrifice my escort mission. Anytime I lose somebody due to REFRAD, or injury, I'll pull them to my mission. My numbers are okay, but the other 2 platoons are steady losing people, and have to put support personnel to work in the towers.

As far as equipment's concerned, we have just got a brand new conex full of stuff that came with the 16th Brigade, less than lethal capabilities, and we're in the process of digging through that. We hadn't had that. We deployed with clear face shields and some clear riot shields. I'm a SWAT Team Leader on a civilian police department, so I've been on raids, and I know the clothing and tools that we need to do the job. I've asked for those things, when we first got there. We didn't get them, so we've made do with what we've had. For instance, collapsible batons are great for that environment, because you don't have to stand there with a stick in your hand. To me, standing there with a stick in your hand, automatically escalating to force. It's unnecessary, if we go in there to hold the prisoners, while they're going in there to do a compound search. We can stand there with our shields, and, quite often, we stand at rest, but we don't even have baton holders. So, we took our riot batons, and sawed them in half, now they're our short batons. Little things like that we've had to improvise.

Talking from my slice of the pie... The new Brigade Sergeant Major came out, last week, and actually spent time with the troops in the towers. He came out and talked to me, and went through our living areas. He seemed like he had a genuine concern for a lot of the things that soldiers brought up. I wasn't at the NCO meeting, but I know a lot of the stuff that was brought up, like uniforms, haircuts, and Army standards. The soldiers told him, "We would love to do those things, Sergeant Major, but we don't have a barbershop or alterations out here," little things like that, and he took a genuine concern to that, and he seemed like he will make something happen.

I never met the Brigade Commander. I've never worked in a brigade setting. I was a grunt, when I was on active duty, and I never met my Brigade Commander, then either.

Sir, the truth of the matter is, I write SOP, and send it up to them. They asked me, when I came back off leave. They said, "We need an IRF SOP," for the oncoming battalion, so I did an SOP. This isn't unique to this battalion. It happened in Kuwait, as well, and at MOB Station. They ask for us to do these SOP's, which I don't know if that's protocol, or not. They do not provide the commander's intent

[REDACTED] reads a sworn statement made by [REDACTED] responds as follows:

[REDACTED] was there at the site, but I can't answer to whether he saw the abuse or not. It was dark out there. When this happened, and the MI soldier said, "I'm a professional," and they started to get out of hand, in my view, I went over to [REDACTED] and said,

"Sir, you gonna let this happen," and he looked at me. I don't know whether or not he knew what I was talking about. I was mad, maybe a little unprofessional, and said, "I'll do something about it, then." I walked over to where the MI people were. They had already dragged the guy back there. I didn't witness the abuse in the back of the truck. My platoon sergeant did. I asked who was in charge, and everything kinda de-escalated from there. So, whether he saw what was going on, I don't know. I don't remember the MI person's name, but he was an E6. I think I asked him what his rank was. When I asked, "Who's in charge of this crew here," he said, "I am," and I asked, "What's your rank?" But, whether I asked him or his ISG, later, I know he was an E6.

That was my only dealing with MI. My opinion is - they just had a couple of their friends killed by a mortar. They were really emotionally amped up, and to bring these guys over here, whether they were guilty or not, it was a bad call. I can say that my escort team escorts prisoners from the various camps, to the MI interrogation cell. They say it gets loud in there, but according to the rules they have posted, there was no abuse going on. They have their rules posted in their TOC, not in the interview area. As I lost people, I pulled my people off that duty, so they're now doing their own escort. The rules state that you can yell at a person...

[REDACTED] present [REDACTED] with the 205th MI's Interrogation Rules of Engagement, asking, "Like this?" [REDACTED] responds as follows:

That's the same thing. We're not given that. That was one of my only dealings with MI, but I don't believe they behave that way all the time. That's the first time I saw those rules. You have to understand, Sir - My LSA is probably about 200 - 300 meters from their LSA, and I never had any reason to go over there, until my guys started doing escorts for them. I was very apprehensive about my soldiers working with their soldiers in such a short time span, after this incident had happened. It was made clear, that if we saw anything like that again, then we were to report it.

I can't remember putting out information about Geneva Hague. We've gone over General Order 1A, and the Rules of Engagement, but specifically reading the Geneva Convention rules of mistreatment... We went over that in MP School. Recently, there was a memorandum put out about things you're not supposed to do. I don't know if that was a knee-jerk reaction to something that happened, but it specifically says things in there about mistreatment, photography, and contraband, stuff like that. My platoon, they know me, and they know my platoon sergeant and me won't stand for that, and we try to set a good example. I know they would report anything to me.

I was there when the abuse happened, and my soldiers looked at me. Well, the first thing that happened was a guy walked up to the prisoner, and shoved his face toward the ground. A couple of my guys said they hit him, but it look like they shoved his head toward the ground. Right there, the flags went off, like this wasn't going to go well - the cursing and the yelling, tempers and everything. That's when I tried to diffuse it by saying, "Hey, that's not professional." That's when the guy fired back at me, that he was

a professional. So, I went ahead and tried to nip it in the bud. I didn't know who the person was, but I felt like it was my responsibility, since I was the ranking person. The prisoner posed no threat to anybody there, and that's just basic rules of engagement. I think the person was bound, and he had a shirt over his head. I don't have a problem with that, but when you start shoving someone around, and screaming and cursing at them in English, I got a problem with that.

I know the chain of command through battalion, but within the last couple of months, COL Pappas, who was the MI Commander, was the FOB Commander, but I don't think the MI had any control over the 320th. The 320th answered straight to the 800th.

I know the mission comes first, but you really got to look out for your troops. You got to be willing to go into conflict to enforce the standard. You can't be afraid to do that. Right now, the way the prison is run it's dangerous. They've been working soldiers on 12-hour shifts, since August. I think somebody needs to put their foot down, and say, "We need to staff that." It's not good for the soldiers to be working in that environment, taking fire, and working 12 hours a day. I'm blessed. We're working 24 hours, but we may only get called twice a day for only an hour at a time. It's not bad for my guys, but when they start pulling cooks to do MP duties... You know.

When you don't have tools to do the job, you got to be willing to push it farther than the person that told you no. If I'm a battalion commander, and you're my brigade commander, and I need X number of troops, to do a mission, and I know they're out there, and you say well we haven't got time, but we've got a week in advance, I'm gonna keep coming at you with that question. I'll say, "Hey, my guys are working 12 hours a day. We're supposed to have X number of soldiers to work all of these camps. What do you mean, 'No.'?" This can't happen. Soldiers are gonna start dying. They're gonna start sleeping on the job. Prisoners are gonna start escaping. We're gonna look like a bunch a idiots out there.

The panel stopped, to discuss [REDACTED] statements.

Finished with their discussion, the panel gave [REDACTED] a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

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ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION OSJA, DARMSTADT, GERMANY	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/14	3. TIME 1900	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS MAJ	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS HQ USAREUR - G3 EXERCISE, HEIDELBERG, GERMANY APO AE			

I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived to Kuwait in January 2003. We were sent to Camp Virginia. I was the Assistant S-3 for the 205th MI BDE. We had several units who were under the 205th MI BDE: 519th MI BN, 165th MI BN, 323rd MI BN, 325th MI BN, 302nd MI BN, 1st MI, and a company minus from the 141st MI BN. The 205th changed command from COL PARRISH to COL PAPPAS the 1st of July 03. When COL PAPPAS took over, we had interrogation operations in 3 locations in IRAQ. At some point a decision was made to consolidate all operations in one location. This locate was Abu Ghraib. Initially, [REDACTED] ABDE S-3 was supposed to go down to Abu Ghraib and be the deputy commander for Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC). But [REDACTED] had to go on another mission to Florida and I was sent by COL PAPPAS to be the deputy because we were getting pressure to set up the JIDC now and not wait. Apparently, LTG Sanchez was not happy with the intelligence coming out of interrogations. I was still the Assistant S-3 and my OER Support Form did not change. I basically added JIDC Deputy role to my OER even though I left a captain with the 205th MI BDE to assume my Assistant S-3 role. COL PAPPAS did not tell me to check on the well-being or care of detainees. He didn't tell me to ensure everyone was in compliance with the IROEs or the Geneva Convention. I do remember seeing the policy that specified that LTG SANCHEZ had to approve certain interrogation techniques. I do not remember a FRAGO referencing the treatment of detainees, however, I do recall the FRAGO categorizing detainees. After [REDACTED] returned from Florida, I remained as the JIDC Deputy. MG MILLER visited Abu Ghraib facility and recommended the Tiger Team concept be implemented. COL PAPPAS and the [REDACTED] told me to implement the concept. The concept I was told was 1x interrogators, 1x linguist, 1x report writer, and 1x analyst. My orders were to go to Abu Ghraib and set up the Tiger Teams to conduct interrogations. This was a vocal order not written on paper. When I first arrived at Abu Ghraib, there were a number (I do not recall the exact number) of personnel from the 519th MI BN. [REDACTED] was the Interrogations Control Element (ICE) OIC and [REDACTED] was there as well. The 519th were already conducting interrogations operations and had a system in place. When I relayed to [REDACTED] what COL PAPPAS' plan was, they were initially opposed to it. [There were some tension between 519th and 325th MI (325th arrived the same time I did). The issue between both battalions was who was better than who. When the 325th was mobilized, they had to go through validation with the 519th. The battalion was validated twice. Then there was a Brigade field exercise and the 325th was the battalion who had to set up all their equipment and run the ranges. The soldiers even had to pull parachute detail. When the 325th asked if some of their soldiers could go to airborne school, they were told no. There were several congressional from both soldiers and officers from the 325th. The complaint was that they were not doing their mission. Plus, the Brigade Commander, therefore, the 325th soldiers were sent to Afghanistan before the soldiers of the 525th MI BDE. After the Brigade commander decided he would demobilize the battalion. The 325th was demobilized only to be brought back on active duty shortly after we were demobilized.] At Abu Ghraib, the MPs were in charge of security of the place and moving the prisoners around. The MPs control the entrances to the prison (Hard Site and Tiers). MI was responsible for interrogation operations. The quality of life was not good. We were operating out of tents and 325th soldiers were living in the old Laundry room. 519th were living in tents erected in the building with the 700th MP BN. Both MPs and MI had their own Living Support Areas. We were being attacked with mortars frequently and had attempts to breach our site often. Even though we were attacked regularly, we were operating out of tents. Not until we had a mortar attack that killed some soldiers did we move operations to buildings. COL PAPPAS gave me daily guidance and I would send my correspondence to COL PAPPAS, [REDACTED] S3, 205th MI, and [REDACTED] Deputy Commander, 205th MI. When a FRAGO came out specifying interrogation operations, I would pass that to [REDACTED] who passed it to [REDACTED] then on to the soldiers. When I arrived, I recall [REDACTED] telling me what we were allowed to do or not do with detainees. The first week we focused on methods while the 519th continued their interrogations. As we discussed the Tiger Team concept, I tried to explain to [REDACTED] that COL PAPPAS wanted this implemented. It took us about a week to get the Tiger Team reorganized. Meanwhile, the soldiers were complaining that the concept made no sense. I told them to just do it because that is what the BDE Commander wanted. Once GTMO representatives arrived on site and explained to everyone the concept and make up of the team, they understood it. The concept was actually an interrogator, a linguist, and an analyst with the support of a report writer [REDACTED]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 3
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT [REDACTED] DATED [REDACTED]"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT

DARMSTADT, GE

DATED 2004/05/14

B. STATEMENT (Continued)

I wanted to integrate both the 325th and 519th soldiers, but we agreed that the 325th would have the night shift and the 519th would have the day shift. We discussed the Interrogation Rules of Engagement. I discussed this with [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] told me that all the 325th were aware of them and had signed the IROEs. [redacted] said the same for the 519th soldiers. I do not recall any Geneva Convention but in the reserves, one is required to get annual training on this. [redacted] and the NCOIC brought all the interrogators together and explained to them how the interrogations were going to be conducted and that they must do the right thing. When I first arrived, I was in charge. I was the Deputy for the JDC [redacted] arrived in early September. I assumed he was going to be the Director but COL PAPPAS told me that [redacted] was going to work with me and that he, COL PAPPAS was still the director and I asked [redacted] what his role was and he said, I guess I am an LNO for CJTF-7 and report to [redacted] and MG FAST. COL PAPPAS never spoke to me and told me what [redacted] role was. When we had operational meeting and we could not agree, he would provide guidance and make recommendations but he was not the guy we would go to for operations. He kind of took over mayoral duties. He worked issues such as getting a gym established, ensuring that soldiers had their personal equipment; weapons, flek vest, and helmet. We had soldiers who would show up without their equipment. [redacted] soldiers went through the 205th RSOI cell in Camp Doha, Kuwait before coming to Abu Ghraib. I would go to [redacted] with these problems and he would say he would handle it. [redacted] also became our link with brigade. [redacted] told me to get [redacted] out of the mayoral business. [redacted] for assistance the MPs. He would attend the daily meetings held by the MPs for all units on site. We went to [redacted] for assistance when we needed it. He did make things happen. He wasn't really involved with interrogations. He was one of the reviewers for the target folders along with [redacted] and me. Once [redacted] arrived, he took over the [redacted] as the operations officer and I remained the Deputy. When brigade would call on specific interrogation issues, they spoke to [redacted] never mentioned to me that one of his roles was to ensure the intelligence flow was operational and work up to C2. In reference to detainee abuse, I once saw a detainee with only part of his head shaved. I told the individual to either shave it all off or don't shave it at all (I do not remember who the individual was). Another time, three interrogators and a linguist went to the prison and requested that two of the female detainees be banded to them for interrogations. They took the detainee into a cell and made her take her shirt off. We found out the following morning COL PAPPAS was notified and requested that the soldiers be segregated and a CID investigation was initiated. The three soldiers invoked their rights, but before one of them invoked their rights, he said he had nothing to do with this incident or the death of the detainee in Afghanistan. (I know nothing about the Afghanistan issue). When [redacted] and I first questioned the linguist, he denied he was there. Not until the MP identified him did he confess being there but said he was outside the cell and didn't see anything. We requested from his language manager for his removal and he was sent to another location. I do not remember the name of the linguist. We sent a five page SIR because we wanted to make sure we had all the specifics. [redacted] told me to tell [redacted] that he did not have to send a five-page report. We had a formation and [redacted] and MYSELF stated that under no circumstances will we tolerate any such incident. No night interrogations were authorized and no male to female interrogations would occur unless you had another female in the booth. I cannot honestly verify that all personnel were there (the admin and system guys). The CACI contractors did not arrive until after [redacted] arrived and the Joint Manning Document was completed. How soon after that, I do not recall. The Joint Manning Document was developed by [redacted] and myself. GTMO personnel helped us develop [redacted] The JMD did not specify military [redacted]. Once it was complete, I sent it up to COL PAPPAS. [redacted] number of linguist etc. I did not get feedback from Brigade on from civilians. It simply had X number of interrogators and [redacted] CJTF-7 Plans Officer. He is the one who worked on the JMD. They just accepted it. I believe it then went up to [redacted] getting it filled by military or civilians. I had no say so on that. The first few CACI contractors who arrived were approximately seven. One was returned because he did not have all the personal equipment. I spoke to their Manager informing him that the linguist were supposed to get their equipment prior to coming out to our location. We relayed that no linguist will be delivered to Abu Ghraib without his or her equipment. When they arrived on site, [redacted] and Myself would Question them on their background to get an idea where they would work. They were assigned as screeners or interrogators. Maybe some got assigned as analyst. I do not know how trained they were on the IROEs or Geneva Convention. We trained them and I believe [redacted] briefed them on the IROEs and they signed the IROEs. I do not know if the interpreters were also trained on the IROEs. I did see the ICRC in the hard site unsupervised. This happened three or four times. The MPs were supposed to sponsor them. The ICRC that came to visit, report that detainees were wearing women's panties. COL PAPPAS said that it better not be happening and thus was not to happen. We brought everyone together and told them to ensure they followed the IROEs. There were no specifics given and no investigation was initiated. In reference to clothing of detainees, the detainees were wearing orange jumpsuits and later on some were wearing blue jumpsuits. This became a problem because some of the Iraqi civilian workers were also wearing the same colored jumpsuit. I notified the MP S3 [redacted] and S [redacted] that this was a force protection concern. [redacted] stated he would handle. I never saw any detainee with women's underwear or saw any women's underwear. I took trips around the detention facility but never saw any detainees totally naked. There were one or two detainees who had only underclothes on. Other Government Agencies (OGA) would come and drop off their detainees in our facilities. The 519th told me they had a problem with this because the detainees were not being accounted for, OGA would drop off detainees without prior notice, they would not let us sit in their interrogations, and we never received any intelligence they might have gathered from the interrogations. I told this to COL PAPPAS and he told me he needed to meet with their boss. I am not sure who I spoke to but [redacted] their boss showed up at an arranged time. [redacted] is about 5'8, Caucasian, well built, hair longer than a military haircut and about 45 yrs. He would show up every now and then. COL PAPPAS told us we would work

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT

DARMSTADT, GE

DATED 2004/05/14

STATEMENT (Continued)

I was told they did not want us to know who they were. I with OGA and allow them to bring detainees and not process them. I advised COL Pappas that we should in process them under an assumed name, this way we would have their finger prints, retina scan and medical screening. Also, advised him we needed a memorandum of agreement because you do not want a detainee to die on us and they are not in processed. Who would take responsibility? He said "I will", "I will." Nothing changed. COL PAPPAS said that OGA did not want our interrogators to sit in their interrogations because this would open our interrogators to liability. He said that OGA would share the intelligence gathered with us. OGA would give us a verbal on what they gathered and stated that a report would follow but they never did. There was no jointness in our operations. The JIDC was an Army and civilian run operations. One morning during the morning staff update, [redacted] came in and told us that a detainee had died. Both LTC PAPPAS and I were shocked. COL PAPPAS said to get [redacted] in and that he was not going down alone on this. OGA did not want to just take the dead body. They placed the body in a body bag and placed ice in it. I was told an autopsy was conducted, I was not privy to the result. I did not have to interview to anyone reference this incident. I never saw or had knowledge of any photos or videos of detainees. I never saw any cameras in the hard site when I toured. One night while walking around I saw an Iraqi Police (IP) talking to a couple of our interpreters in the IP area. We stopped that and told the interpreters that they were not allowed in the IP area unless authorized by [redacted] his supervisor or me. The MPs controlled the detention facility. We provided the MPs a list of personnel who had access. [redacted] (told interpreter personnel that if he saw any linguist talking with the IP after duty hours in the IP area, we would recommend they be fired. I never saw any guard dogs used during interrogations, they were not there when I was there. We had a very tough situation. There were three battalions on the ground and they all reported to someone different not to [redacted] or MYSELF. I accidentally heard [redacted] state that several personnel were going to be going on leave and I had no idea. Personnel were coming and going and I had no control over them. I was supposed to be running an operation and yet I had no control of the personnel working in the JIDC. I sent a message to Bn Commanders and BDE commander soliciting their support. I could not run the mission if I had no control of the personnel and I did the best I could. We had a situation where a male and female were cohabitating. I told their ISG that one of them had to go and for him to decide. He complain to his command. [redacted] called me very upset and said that the battalion was telling him I had no decision as to who left the area. I told him to hear my story. After he heard my story, he supported me. I spoke to the S-3 about the issue with control of personnel but nothing changed.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?
 A. No [redacted]

End of Statement

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
 (Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 14th day of MAY 2004 at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[redacted]
 (Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
 (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of the form, see AR 180-45; the proponent agency is DCSO/SOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2051; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSA).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/06/06	3. TIME 15:00	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS SPC/RA	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center, Baghdad Central Correction Facility, Iraq

I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I reviewed various photographs of the alleged detainee abuses and identified the following: In photograph 3b5b8beda012e4d61fd e62916523fdb9.jpg, the male with black shirt, standing in the background and leaning towards a detainee, was a CACI contractor [REDACTED]. In photograph [REDACTED] the male in a black shirt was also [REDACTED]. In photograph labeled [REDACTED] the male on the left in a black shirt was also [REDACTED]. In photograph labeled [REDACTED] the male in the black top was also [REDACTED]. The scene in photograph labeled [REDACTED] depicts the cell of the detainee that was shot after firing at an MP in November or December 2003. Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement. A: No.

END OF STATEMENT

NOT USED

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADLINE "STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT [REDACTED] DATED [REDACTED]"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT JIDC, BCCF, Iraq DATED 2004/06/06

B. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT USED

AFFIDAVIT

[REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE [REDACTED]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 06 day of June, 2004 at JIDC, BCCF, Iraq

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
UCMJ Article 136 (b)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF [REDACTED] PAGES

04 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Telephonic Interview of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 04 June 2004, I conducted a telephonic interview of [REDACTED]. The below statement is what [REDACTED] told me based on questions I asked her. She had reviewed the statement and stated it is accurate. She is now waiting to see the JAG Officer at Fort Richardson:

[REDACTED]
SSN: [REDACTED]
Unit: A/325th MI BN

I arrived in Kuwait on 9 April 2004. On 28 April we convoyed to Iraq into Balad. While in Balad, I was placed on a Tactical HUMINT Team as part of the 18th MP BDE at Camp Victory. I stayed on the THT until the first or second week of August 2004 when I was transferred to Camp Cropper to conduct interrogation operations. At Camp Cropper, [REDACTED] was in charge of interrogation operations and [REDACTED] was in charge of MI personnel from the 325th MI BN. When I arrived at Camp Cropper, we received a briefing on operations from [REDACTED]. I conducted around 70 interrogations at Camp Cropper. Screenings were conducted in the warehouse next to the area where the detainees stayed. We also had a few interrogation booths inside the warehouse and in our office building. While at Camp Cropper, I never saw or was aware of any detainee abuse, or humiliation of detainees. At Camp Cropper I did not interrogate with any particular individual or linguist we would rotate linguists and sometimes interrogate with other interrogators. On 15 September, I relocated to Abu Ghraib. I didn't conduct any interrogations the first week I was there. We were taken on a tour of the facilities and were told by 519th personnel [REDACTED] on what was going on. There really was no right seat ride because we began interrogating at night and the 519th MI personnel were interrogating during the day. The Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) was not briefed to us when we first arrived, because we were not working yet. We did get them later the night we started interrogations and when new personnel would arrive on several occasions. Sometime when [REDACTED] arrived, we received the IROEs. When I first began interrogations, I fell under the supervision of [REDACTED] and the linguist [REDACTED]. Later [REDACTED] became my team leader, [REDACTED] was our team analyst. I conducted interrogations with [REDACTED]. After the structure changed again, we were put into tiger teams where it was I and [REDACTED] and linguist [REDACTED]. Our interrogation plans would go to [REDACTED] who would then submit it to higher. I am not sure who would sign off on it. I know that [REDACTED] would sign some of them. I submitted an interrogation plan to interrogate a detainee naked. [REDACTED] stated "we're going to have to get this

AG0000488

DOD 000576

signed." I do not recall who from operations signed and approved the interrogation plan. At the beginning the interrogation plans were not really written. My team [REDACTED] and myself) were a little more organized and wrote the interrogation plan a couple of days before or sometimes the morning of the interrogation depending on what we had obtained from the previous interrogation. Those approving the Interrogation Plan were either [REDACTED]. I never placed any of my detainees on sleep deprivation. I did use a stress position, at first they did not have to be approved, but later they did. I believe I did request Isolation for one detainee. I do not remember who approved it. I believe the individual I requested Isolation for was [REDACTED] but he was already in isolation when I received his file, so I had to request to keep him in isolation. We wanted him in isolation to separate him from the group of individuals who he had been captured with. After [REDACTED] was transferred to another team [REDACTED] became mine and [REDACTED] team leader. There were times when we would go to the Hard Site and found the detainees naked. It wasn't unusual to see them naked. If you simply passed by the hallway by the isolation area you would not see the detainees naked. You had to go up to the cell to see that detainees were naked. I can't remember seeing the Operations leadership down in the Hard Site, but I didn't spend too much time there. I do remember seeing [REDACTED] there when he was delivering feminine products to the female MP that he had collected from use for the female detainees. If others were at the hard site, I didn't pay much attention. I was too bogged with my work. I usually worked from 0800 to right before it got dark. I was only on the night shift for about a weeks and we worked from around 2100 to 0900 I never went to the isolation area during this time period. I only did interrogations outside in tents, while we were being attacked by mortars nightly. I departed Abu Ghraib around 15 November 2004. I never witness or was aware of any detainee abuse, photos or videos of detainee abuse or humiliation of detainees. I never witnessed or was aware of any detainee with women's underwear. I have advised by [REDACTED] that I do not discuss this with anyone because discussing this with anyone could jeopardize the investigation. I have also been told by [REDACTED] that if I receive any e-mail from anyone reference the PROCEDURE 15, I should forward them to her.

[REDACTED]
Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951, E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/04/27	3. TIME 1830	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS SPC	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, Deployed to Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 15 October 2003 to conduct interrogation operations. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received an orientation on Iraqi culture like Ramadan and the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) on what you could or could not do but I did not receive any Geneva Convention training. We did receive it later. I was really surprised on the ground level rules. We had rules but the MPs had no ground rules on how to conduct detainee handling. We really didn't know what they could or could not do to a detainee. I don't really know who was in charge of the MPs but COL PAPPAS was in charge of MI. I think COL PAPPAS was in charge of the site. I saw _____ around and believe he was the JIDC Commander. He was doing the same job _____ is currently doing. I never witness detainee abuse. I did see naked detainees. I think it happened one night in December. I was picking up a detainee to take him to the stairwell room to interrogate him. I believe anytime there was a new detainee in the segregation area they were stripped of their clothes. I asked the person (MP) with the naked detainee if that was approved. That individual told me to stay out of it. I told them that we were not allowed to do that. I reported it to my NCOIC _____. She told me that was a problem between MI and the MPs because there was no written SOP for the MPs. I heard here was the use of dogs but I never saw it. I can't remember who told me. It wasn't until CID began the investigation that I learned that there were allegations of detainee abuse. the only time I knew of any possible foul play was when I found out _____ was disciplined for walking a naked detainee back to his camp. We were allowed to interrogate by the stairs in the segregated area and the shower room. The command was aware of this

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A. No

////////////////////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////////////////////

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

AG0000490

4. STATEMENT (Continued)

[REDACTED]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY, WITHOUT HOPE OF REWARD OR PUNISHMENT, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004 at Abu Ghayb Correction Facility

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Fort Huachuca MID, Fort Huachuca, AZ
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/06/10
3. TIME: 1037
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME:
6. SSN:
7. GRADE/STATUS: Civilian
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: E Co, 309th MI Bn, Fort Huachuca, AZ

9. I WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
From 7 - 21 Oct 03, I was at Abu Ghraib (AG), Iraq as part of a five person Mobile Training Team (MTT) from Fort Huachuca, AZ. The mission of the team was to provide an overall assessment of interrogation operations, training and advice and assistance. My focus was interrogation operations. I spent time with the interrogators during interrogations observing and providing immediate feedback. Upon our arrival at AG, we were greeted by [redacted]. We were also provided a tour of the facility. The team spent the first couple of days setting up, conducting an assessment of the operations and establishing a training schedule based on the assessment. The training lasted five days and encompassed various aspects of interrogation operations. Throughout our time at AG the interrogators remained open and receptive to the training and subsequent advice and assistance. The training included the TIGER TEAM concept which had been very effective in interrogation operations at GTMO. When we got there, the interrogators had already started to employ this technique as the analysts participated in the interrogations. After the training, I spent the rest of the time with the interrogator teams. I sat in on approximately four interrogations and indirectly observed several more. Throughout our time at AG the MTT would get together at night to discuss findings and recommendations. We also continued to enhance the training schedule as there were several civilian contract interrogators scheduled to arrive at AG. The Intelligence Rules of Engagement (IROE) was posted and was very similar to the IROE used in Afghanistan. During my observation of interrogation operations, the 519th demonstrated experience and dedication to the mission. I did have concerns with the newly arriving contract interrogators. We did not have the opportunity to work with them or provide any training. Some interrogators were not actively using approaches, they more or less utilized direct questioning and when that did not work, they gave up. The interrogations were not conducted in a timely manner. In some cases, when an interrogator picked an approach, he would not plan it out and get guidance from the team leader prior to the interrogation. They were also not using their interpreters effectively. There was a set level for approval on the various approaches and techniques. Most techniques required a very specific written plan with a schedule and parameters. The MP's appeared to be in control and professional. I did see detainees in various states of dress to include nakedness and detainees wearing towels. The MP's used segregation and stripping as a way to keep the detainees under control and to keep them from talking. On one occasion, I participated in an interrogation with [redacted]. When we entered the cell, the detainee was wearing a towel around his waist. After the interrogation, I asked [redacted] if he was going to get the detainee his clothes back. [redacted] told me he would talk to the MP's. [redacted] appeared to be a motivated and enthusiastic interrogator who seemed to understand the concept of intelligence interrogations. I never saw him lose control of his emotions during an interrogation and he took advice and assistance well. On one occasion, I had a conversation with [redacted] concerning the IROE and interrogation approaches. I gave him examples of approaches including Pride and Ego Down where and interrogator took a Koran, threw it on the floor and stepped on it and Fear Up Harsh where the interrogator had a dog trained to bark on cue if the interrogator thought the detainee was lying. I also explained sleep deprivation. I told him that in Afghanistan the interrogators could use an adjusted sleep schedule for detainees. The conversation was meant to explain why these activities were prohibited or restricted. [redacted] appeared to understand. There was intense pressure from the command to provide intelligence reporting. During my time at AG, I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees. I never witnessed nor heard of any MI person asking or insinuating that an MP should abuse a detainee. I never witnessed nor heard of any MP offering to abuse a detainee to assist interrogation operations. I never witnessed nor heard of any guard dogs being used during interrogations.
Q Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A No.
End of Statement

ID EXHIBIT:
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT:
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF" TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

AG0000492

STATEMENT OF



TAKEN AT

Fort Huachuca MID

DATED

2004/06/10

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

[Redacted statement content]

AFFIDAVIT

WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE [Redacted] I HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES

[Redacted witness information]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

STATEMENT OF [Redacted]

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10th day of June at the Fort Huachuca Military Intelligence Detachment. (Signature of Person Administering Oath) [Redacted]

From [REDACTED]

Sent Monday, June 21, 2004 8:09 am

To [REDACTED]

Cc [REDACTED]

Bcc [REDACTED]

Subject Regarding our conversation

[REDACTED] the following are statements I made to [REDACTED] during one conversation where he approached me asking for ideas as to how to get these prisoners to talk:

I talked briefly about the approach ROE. Then I told him that I'd heard that dogs had been used successfully and that they could be intimidating. I told him the story about the dog that was trained to bark on cue and suggested that he talk to the MPs about the possibilities. I told him that the basic approach strategies would be most successful within the first few hours of capture, because that's when a prisoner's stress level was highest and once they become accustomed to the environment, their stress level decreases and their resistance increases. I told him that these prisoners are captured by soldiers, taken from their familiar surroundings, blindfolded and put into a truck and brought to this place; and then they are pushed down a hall with guards barking orders and thrown into a cell, naked; and that not knowing what was going to happen or what the guards might do caused them extreme fear. I told him that he should explain to the guards how this fear works to his advantage and tell them not to get friendly with the prisoners, or try to converse with them or give them cigarettes and stuff. I told him that the guards should appear as though they could be harsh, abrasive and ... I used some extremely harsh words to describe the level of fear that the prisoner should feel. I told him that this fear, the guards, this place all come together to create a harsh environment and that this sets the stage for the interrogator. I told him that he should be the first friendly face the prisoner sees, and that the prisoner will want to talk to relieve his fear. I suggested he have someone take some pictures of what seemed to be guards being rough with prisoners, so he could use them to scare the prisoners. I also described what I thought was a formal, professional prisoner in-processing as I observed it in Bagram.

I did not intend for any prisoner to get hurt. My only intent was for the prisoner to imagine what could happen.

[REDACTED]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DDCSOP5

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 501; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1983 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Fort Huachuca MD, Fort Huachuca, AZ
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/06/30
3. TIME: 0830
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
6. SSN
7. GRADE/STATUS: Civilian
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: E Co, 309th MI Bn, Fort Huachuca, AZ

I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
I am making this statement in addition to the statement executed on 10 Jun 03 at 1037. This subsequent statement relates a conversation I had with [redacted] and relevant background information. From 27 Sep to 5 Oct 03 I was deployed to Afghanistan to observe interrogation operations and offer advice and assistance. We provided suggestions on how to improve the effectiveness of interrogation planning, approaches, questioning technique, reporting and the use of interpreters. Our training was limited to small group discussion as the operations were already established and the interrogators were conducting interrogations around the clock. While there, I observed the inprocessing procedures for incoming detainees. The operation was very efficient and professional. The whole process took less than one hour from initial reception to the time the detainee was seen by an interrogator. This had an advantage as the detainee was still disoriented from the capture and would be more likely to answer questions posed by the interrogators. On 7 Oct 03, I arrived in Abu Ghraib (AG) to assess interrogation operations and conduct the training I referenced in my previous statement. After observing [redacted] conduct at least two interrogations, and prior to the start of the training, I had an offline conversation with [redacted]. He approached me asking for ideas as to how to get "these detainees to talk" referring to those who were believed to know the source of the incoming mortars. During the conversation, I told [redacted] about the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) to ensure he knew of their existence. I told [redacted] for a story I heard in Afghanistan of a dog used during an interrogation. The dog was trained to bark on cue and would bark any time the interrogator had reason to believe the detainee was lying during the interrogation. I told him that this would probably not be allowed, but that the presence of barking dogs in the prison might be effective. I told him of a story of an interrogator using a Pride and Ego Down approach. The interrogator took a copy of a Koran and threw it on the ground and stepped on the Koran, which resulted in a detainee riot. I explained to him that an adjusted sleep schedule was used on detainees in Afghanistan. The process was closely monitored and used to disorient the detainee. Subsequently, I explained that basic approach strategies would be most effective within the first few hours of capture and that they needed to do timely interrogations. The more comfortable a detainee gets with his surroundings, the stronger his resistance becomes. I described the fear that I imagined a detainee might experience in that environment. I also said that the MP's need to understand that this fear works to the interrogator's advantage and that the MP's shouldn't get friendly with the source by trying to converse or offer cigarettes and the like that the interrogator might use as incentives to establish rapport. This type of friendly MP interaction was claimed to be a hindrance to interrogation in Afghanistan. I also suggested the possibility of showing the detainees pictures of what appeared to be MP's in intimidating positions with detainees. I did not describe pictures of MP's actually abusing detainees. If the MP's were actually allowed to abuse the detainees, there would be no reason to have the pictures. The purpose of the pictures was to allow the detainee's initial fear to persist until the interrogator relieved that fear and established rapport. At this point, I described detainee inprocessing as I observed it in Afghanistan. I never personally witnessed the above incidents, but heard about them from other interrogation facility personnel. I encouraged [redacted] to attend the upcoming training. I also made sure [redacted] knew that any interrogation approach or technique had to be included into the interrogation plan and had to be approved by the chain of command. I am sure that [redacted] understood that no technique could be used outside the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and required chain of command approval prior to implementation. [redacted] only attended portions of the training that we provided at AG. I did not participate in or hear about any other member of the MTT participating in any other offline conversations with the assigned interrogation facility personnel. I never advocated the physical abuse of detainees and I am sure that [redacted] understood that my intent was to only take advantage of the detainees pre-existing fear.
Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A: No.
End of Statement

10. EXHIBIT
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT [redacted] DATED [redacted]"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

AG0000495

DOD 000583

STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT

Fort Huachuca MID

DATED

2004/06/10

B. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT

USED

AFFIDAVIT

I HAVE READ AND FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10th day of June 2004

at the Fort Huachuca Military Intelligence Detachment

(Official Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CAMP VICTORY	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/09	3. TIME 1411	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]		6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS SSG
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 372nd Military Police Company			

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived to Abu Ghraib in early October. I was assigned as the Dayshift Supervisor of Tier 1 through 3. I had between 13-18 soldiers at any one time. And we had several responsibilities at Abu Ghraib. Tier 1A belonged to MI for detainees of intelligence value and Tier 1B belonged to MPs for disciplinary from either Camp Ganci or Vigilant or for detainees that were suspected to have a mental disability and could not cope with other detainees in general population of the hard site. [REDACTED] was the Nightshift Supervisor and [REDACTED] was the NCOIC of the Tiers. I never witnessed or was made aware of any detainee abuse, any photos or videos of detainees until I saw them on TV. I have no knowledge of dogs being used as a tool during interrogations during the day shift or night shift. Canine were used for search during the handgun incident. Dogs were brought in and stood on the side and were barking. The day of the handgun there were many people in the hard site. I saw [REDACTED] who I had never seen before there. There were many folks with civilian clothes. One day a dog handler came in and asked if he could walk the dog through the hard site. I told him fine but not to go where the prisoners were and stay in the hallway. As far as interrogation techniques used, I saw a lot of yelling but never any hands laid on a detainee. MI liked [REDACTED] because he would get in the detainees face, but I never witnessed or heard of him touching a detainee. During the night of the handgun incident ICOs (Iraqi Correction Officers) were gathered up and suspected corrupted ICOs were identified by Military Police and where stripped search in the Iraqi Police supervisor office. This event happened during the night shift and I had no say so during this shift. I didn't really interact with MI due to the fact of other obligations and MI showed only to pick up or drop off a detainee. The only things out of the ordinary that I can recall were about the "ghost" detainees dropped off by Other Government Agencies (OGA). These detainees were dropped off but were not given a detainee number or logged in. The personnel dropping them off had no name and brought them in at about 0400 in the morning. One day as I was walking the hard site, I saw in Tier 1 on the second floor, a two detainees on the ground facing down with only his shirt, a bag over his head and naked below his waist. I told my MP to cover him up and a blanket was placed over the detainee. I spoke to the OGA there and the detainee was taken to the interrogation room to one of the showers. The OGA there was wearing civilian clothes, had no facial hair, Caucasian, medium built, name unknown. The interpreter on site was a short round man with reddish beard. This occurred in mid December. The other incident I witnessed was when the ICRC was visiting and I was escorting them. There was a tub in the middle of the hallway with wires coming out and going into a cell. I picked up the tub and there was a transformer there. I opened the cell and there was a huge radio and a naked detainee in the cell. The detainee was not in the open and was alone. I asked someone who the hell place him there but no one knew. When I would make my rounds in the morning I would find detainees in Tier 1B without clothes. I would ask why they didn't have any clothes and I was told that they were that way before shift started. No names were given. I would have the MPs give them clothes. In the beginning, I did see detainees in the MI side with women's underwear and one with a suit covering his private parts with two MRE containers. I did not understand it because when they came in from Vigilant, Ganci, or other places, they were clothed. I was told it was MI's way of making an uncomfortable environment in which helped with interrogations. (This event occurred during the Company's OJT process with the 72nd MP CO with [REDACTED] and the NCOIC (unable to remember name) prior to taking over as shift supervisor). I never witnessed or was aware of making an MP to "soften-up" or give "the treatment" to an MP nor do I feel that they would of ask me due to possible refusal of an unlawful request. MI would tell us to take certain articles of clothes (jumpsuit), the mattress, or put them in sleep deprivation. They were always left with some clothing. [REDACTED] a civilian interrogator, stands out in my mind. He never spoke to me and avoided me. When the chain of command was relieved and we changed personnel in the night shift I recommended [REDACTED] to replace [REDACTED] on tier 1. [REDACTED] went to [REDACTED] and asked that [REDACTED] be removed from the night shift. [REDACTED] had called for a medic to see a detainee claiming to have chest pains during a sleep management schedule in which the medic prescribed medicine and the detainee was taken off of the sleep plan. This detainee was known to have a heart condition. [REDACTED] got mad because he said that [REDACTED] interrupted the sleep plan. My impression was that [REDACTED] did not want [REDACTED] on the night shift because [REDACTED] would not do what [REDACTED] wanted. There were some tensions between MPs and MI. Tier 1A fell under MI control but we had to monitor the sleep plans and implement MI's plan's with detainees. They should have been the ones who monitored their prisoners. The only two MI personnel that I really dealt with were [REDACTED]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF [REDACTED] PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

AG0000497

DOD 000585

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY

DATED 2004/05/07

STATEMENT (Continued)

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] They would come in and check on detainees. The interpreter that I can remember the most was [REDACTED]. He would come by the Hard Site about three times a day. He was the one we could use to speak to the security detainees because he had a clearance. We had an impression he was a homosexual. We really didn't know what MI's procedures were. (MI meaning OGA and military). I had asked for the Interrogation Rules of Engagement and a MI liaison to work side by side with MP on the tier but I never got them. Once the new unit came on board. Things got a lot better between MI and MPs. MI placed a liaison [REDACTED] who would notify us of detainees' arrival and departures and would keep the MPs up to date with security detainees status.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?

A. No.

////////////////////////////////////End of Statement//////////////////////////////////// [REDACTED]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7TH day of MAY, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[REDACTED]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form see AF 190-45; the proponent agency is DDCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951, E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSM);
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Building AT-5636 Gorham St; Fort Bragg, NC 28310
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/06/15
3. TIME:
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME:
6. SSN:
7. GRADE/STATUS: E-4/AD
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: A Company, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Brigade

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From the end of Aug 03 to 13 Feb 04, I deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG), Iraq with A Company, 519th MI Bn. I am a 97E Interrogator. I did not arrive with the other 519th MI Bn personnel as I was on emergency leave during the initial move into AG. Upon my arrival to AG, I was briefed on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), which established our authorized limits concerning interrogation techniques. On at least two occasions as the IROE changed, I signed a memorandum stating I read, understood, and would follow the IROE. The IROE made it necessary to get authorization to do certain techniques and approaches. I sat in on a couple of interrogations before I conducted interrogations on my own. I was not with the unit in Afghanistan, so I can not cite any differences between the AG IROE and the IROE used in Afghanistan. Certain techniques had to have written approval. The mechanism for this approval was the interrogation plan, which had to be done and approved prior to any interrogation. The interrogator would request an approach in the interrogation plan and then submit it to their team leader who would ensure the plan was approved. Over time, the authorization process evolved into requiring special written permission to use special interrogation methods like sleep deprivation. I have had several requests to be interviewed by the New York Times concerning the possible MP abuse of several Iraqi Generals. In approximately Nov 03, I conducted an interrogation of an Iraqi General. Upon my initial meeting with the detainee, it was obvious he had been physically abused. I asked the detainee how he had sustained his injuries and he told me the MP's had beaten him up. He also said there were other Generals who were beaten up at the same time. I checked his information and found that he had been in the facility long enough that the injuries had to have been sustained during his time as a detainee. I reported this information to my higher headquarters as well as included the incident in the interrogation notes. I also conducted another interrogation of an Iraqi General who also appeared to have been physically abused by the MP's. In both cases, the detainees did not know the names of the MP's involved in the abuse. Although I did not interrogate any other abused Iraqi General, there were reportedly three other Generals who claimed to be abused by the MP's. I reported this information to the Criminal Investigative Command (CID) in Jan 04. I have been contacted by the New York Times on several occasions to provide additional information. I have discussed this with my chain of command and have been advised to refer all inquiries concerning AG to the Army Public Affairs Office. In Dec 03 I did witness the authorized use of a guard dog in an interrogation. The dog handler would let the guard dog get in close proximity of the detainee possibly without a muzzle so the dog could bark and frighten the detainee. I suspected they were not muzzled because of the volume of the barking. Although I was not a direct witness as the incident occurred in an interrogation booth, I did hear the dog in the booth with the interrogators and the detainee. I did hear the MP's make general comments from time to time something to the effect of "give me five minutes with the detainee and he will start talking." I believe this type of comment to have been made only for humor value. On at least four occasions I witnessed detainees in the nude. On these occasions I would go to the MP's and request a detainee for interrogation. Upon arriving at their cell, they were naked. On one occasion, the detainee had his clothes in his cell, but did not have them on when I went to interrogate the detainee. assisted me in this interrogation. After our arrival at the cell, the MP's instructed the detainee to put on his clothes and he was then escorted to the interrogation tent. On three occasions, the MP's had taken the detainee's clothing away and the items were not available. Twice the detainees were given sheets to wear during the interrogations and the other time an orange jump suit was provided. Instead of making the detainees walk across the facility, we conducted the interrogations in the building. One interrogation was conducted in the shower area on the second level and the others were conducted in the in the stairwell on the first floor. The detainees were at times stripped during their inprocessing and subsequent screening. was the NCOIC of the screening section and may have ordered the detainees to remain stripped as a form of humiliation. It was a practice, especially for MI holds to take their clothes in a possible attempt to renew the "capture shock" of detainees who had been in US custody for an extended period of time or were transferred from other facilities. I did hear rumors that may have gotten a little too physical with a male apprehended as a possible suspect for the 20 Sep 03 mortar attack which killed four US soldiers and injured several more. Other than the incidents discussed above, I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees. I never witnessed nor heard of any MI person asking or insinuating that an MP should abuse a detainee. I never witnessed nor heard of any MP seriously offering to abuse a detainee to assist interrogation operations.

10. EXHIBIT:
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT:
PAGE 1 OF PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

AG000499

DOD 000587

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

3. LOCATION 95th Regional Readiness Command, Coraopolis, PA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/29	TIME 1700	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS SSG/F-6	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
1st Engineer Battalion, 3rd Combat Support Brigade, 95th Division, Fort Leonard Wood, MO

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am a HUMINT Collection Interrogator (MOS 97E) currently assigned to the 1st Engineer Battalion (BN), 3rd Combat Support Brigade (BDE), 95th Division, Fort Leonard Wood, MO. I also hold MOS's 95B (Military Police (MP)) and 51M (Firefighter). I am also a Tagalog linguist. I was granted MOS 95B on 22 Nov 96, and I had not actively worked the 97E MOS since then. I was mobilized in MOS 97E for Operation Iraqi Freedom on 20 Feb 03, and was crossed level to B Co, 325th Military Intelligence (MI) BN. I reported to the B Co, 325 MI Bn at Fort Dix, NJ, on 20 Feb 03 and remained undergoing pre-deployment training and integration into B Co, 325 MI Bn. I received classes on interrogations techniques, interrogation approaches, report writing, combat operations, reaction drills, and weapons qualification. I departed Fort Dix on 21 Mar 03, and arrived at Camp Virginia, Kuwait, on 23 Mar 03. I remained at Camp Virginia until 29 April 03 when we convoyed to Balad Airbase arriving at Balad Airbase on 30 April 03. At Balad Airbase, I was busy with routine details and I did not participate in any interrogations or other operational matters. On 17 May 03, I went to Camp Cropper at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) where I worked predominately in screening and interrogation operations. The 519th MI BN had already set up operations there by the time I had arrived at Cropper. There was only one interrogation incident that I witnessed at Cropper that I thought was a little odd. 519th interrogators were interrogating a detainee who they believed was a Wahabbi extremist. The interrogators had the detainee in a stress position down on his knees with his arms stretched out to both sides. I asked interrogators of the 519th and [redacted] of the B/325MI about it, but they stated that this was a normal technique, and I didn't think more of it. Other than this incident, I never saw any unauthorized interrogation techniques or abuses. However, while at Camp Cropper, I was concerned about some detainees that were brought in by SEAL Team 5 and Task Force 20 that appeared to be very severely beaten. When we would inquire about their wounds, the SEALs/TF-20 members would provide a general "they resisted" response. [redacted] was responsible for recording these injuries and wrote reports, I believe, on all such incidents. I don't recall [redacted] unit, but I believe it was an Army Reserve unit from South Carolina, and I recall that he worked for the Charlotte (NC) Police Department. On 12 Sep 03, about 15 members of the 325th transferred to Abu Garayb (AG), and I followed them arriving at AG on 5 Oct 03 after closing down my operations at Cropper. When I arrived at AG, I, as well as all other personnel, received classes on Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and [redacted] statement acknowledging that they had received and understood the IROE. It appeared to me that [redacted] attached from the 66th MI Group as the ICE NCOIC, had a clear training program for newly assigned MI personnel. [redacted] trained personnel on a very clear IROE and she clearly instructed that interrogation techniques beyond those authorized in FM 34-52 would not be used and that if someone witnesses unauthorized techniques, they should report it. It appeared there was no room for misunderstanding of the IROE. When I arrived at AG, I was teamed up with [redacted] the Joint Detention and Interrogation Center (JDIC) Operations Officer who was already at AG. I worked special projects for [redacted] created and maintained targeting lists, and performed various other functions in the operational area. I never personally participated in any interrogations at AG, although I did observe a few in the booths, but I never saw any problems. When the organic assets of the 325th departed AG on or about 15 Nov 03, I replaced the departing [redacted] and became the JDIC Operations NCOIC, still working for [redacted] arranging interrogation facilities, booths and detainee availability, overseeing the various JDIC sections (CM&D, Fusion Cell, Detainee Assessment Board (DAB), and tracking the status of detainees in Isolation and any requests for extensions of those detainees past the 30 day limit. When [redacted] the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Officer-in-Charge (OIC) would submit any requests for authority past those granted in FM 34-52, she would "carbon copy" me on those requests and I would track the status of Isolation detainees. My understanding was that [redacted] sent the requests directly to COL PAPPAS, the 205th MI BDE Commander, after mid Nov 03 when he moved permanently to AG, and possibly straight to CJTF-7 for LTG SANCHEZ's signature, prior to COL PAPPAS' residency at AG. I never saw any requests from the ICE [redacted] for the use of military working dogs, and to my knowledge, the use of dogs was never approved while I was at AG. While I do recall seeing some requests for "Sleep Deprivation", I do not recall seeing any approvals for its use. However, [redacted] only provided me a couple of approvals from COL PAPPAS or CJTF-7, and it was not a routine practice or procedure that I would have received them. While at AG, I never saw any physical abuse of detainees.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

AG0000501

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Coraopolis, PA

DATED 2004/05/25

STATEMENT (Continued)

nor did anyone ever report any such abuse to me. I did hear rumors of one incident involving three 519th male interrogators who entered Cell Block 1B and conducted a late night "unauthorized interrogation" of a female inmate who was not an MI Hold. Following the incident, [REDACTED] reviewed the IROE, but nothing was really put out to the Command about the incident. This is the only incident of physical abuse of which I heard. In Jan 04, I was approached by CID during the course of their investigation into detainees abuses at AG and showed me photographs and videos of detainees and soldiers and asked me to identify individuals in the photos/videos. Prior to that CID presentation, I had never saw any unauthorized photographs or videos of any detainees, nor did I hear of any, nor did anyone ever inform me of any. I never saw military working dogs being used during MI interrogation operations. On only one occasion, I saw a detainee completely naked in the hard site, but he had just finished showering and he was not on display for humiliation purposes. I never saw any inmate in women's underwear, nor did I ever hear of anyone discussing it, nor did anyone ever report it to me. [REDACTED] an MP NCO, once told me that one of the detainees in Cell Block 1A, second tier, like to wear women's underwear, but I personally never saw any inmate dressed in female clothes. There was only one incident that I heard of concerning striping a detainee. [REDACTED] an interrogator, and [REDACTED] an analyst, were conducting an interrogation of a detainee in the hard site. The detainee apparently was not cooperating with [REDACTED] and she had him strip down, I believe to his underwear, and then walked him in his underwear to the Camp Vigilant portion of AG. It was sometime in Nov 03 and it was very cold. I heard that both [REDACTED] received oral reprimands from [REDACTED]. Both were permanently removed from interrogation duties; [REDACTED] came to work for me in Operations (I was on "R & R" leave from 22 Nov to 15 Dec 03, and [REDACTED] was assigned to Operations by the time I had returned) and [REDACTED] was moved to the Fusion Cell. [REDACTED] told me about the incident, inquiring if I thought he would get in trouble over it. I told him I thought he would, since he had participated in an unauthorized technique. Regarding [REDACTED] I am shocked by their involvement in these abuses. Because [REDACTED] had been involved in the "stripping" incident in Nov 03, it did not surprise me as much as [REDACTED]'s involvement was really a surprise since we worked fairly close together. I didn't really know [REDACTED] so I was neither surprised nor not surprised. I was not as surprised about him as I was about [REDACTED]. When I arrived at AG, things were pretty squared away. [REDACTED] seemed to have things under control. I didn't ever see anything out of control. To answer MG Fay's question about "what was going on at AG", I don't really know why things went wrong. I am surprised, shocked, and troubled with the incidents of abuse and the fact that some MI soldiers did not report incidents they had witnessed. There is no doubt in my mind that all soldiers in the JIDC were briefed on the IROE numerous times and the recourse if the IROE was violated and not reported. I departed AG on emergency leave on 22 Jan 04 and never returned there. I have nothing further to add to this statement.//////
 END OF STATEMENT

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE [REDACTED] AND ENDS ON PAGE [REDACTED], I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[REDACTED] Signature of Person Making Statement

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25 day of May, 2004
 at 99th RRC, Coraopolis, Pennsylvania

[REDACTED] Signature of Person Administering Oath

[REDACTED] (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Metro Park Springfield	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/24	3. TIME 1800	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS O3	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS Human Resources Command, OPMD, Alexandria, VA 22332			

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was the S-3, 205th MI Bde, V Corps from 10 June 2002 to 31 March 2004. I was in Kuwait from Nov 2002 until Dec 2002. I deployed back into Kuwait on 14 Feb 2003 and went into Iraq with the forward element of the 205th in April 2003 and remained in Iraq until 6 Feb 2004. My rater was the Brigade DCO - first [REDACTED] and then [REDACTED]. My senior rater was the Brigade Commander - first [REDACTED] then COL Thomas Pappas. The 205th has 3 organic battalions consisting of approximately 850 personnel. For the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) the Brigade grew to seven battalions and had a strength of 1650 personnel. At first we had no organic or attached interrogation capability and very little organic CI in theater. We relied at first on the 513th for both interrogation and CI support. Later on (APR/MAY 2003) the Bde's attached elements of the 519th, 323rd and 325th arrived in theater and provided the Corps with a robust interrogation capability. Our original planning for the initial portion of the campaign envisioned 100s of detainees/PWs which would be handled in stages in a tiered approach. They would be screened and initially processed by Bde and Div elements and then moved successively thru Corps detention facilities ending up with the 513th theater detention facility. Initial planning called for two Corps facilities - 519th, which had Balkans and OEF experience would be forward and the 325th (with limited Afghanistan experience) handling the rear. However, the rapid rate of the maneuver advance and the deployment timeline of our attached interrogation assets prevented this plan from coming to fruition. Our planning called for approximately 10 to 15% of the detainees having intelligence potential for exploitation. As the maneuver units brought more and more detainees to the detention center in central Baghdad (vic Baghdad International Airport (BIAP)), overcrowding became an issue. The Brigade's focus was on screening the newly arrived detainees to determine if they had intelligence value and then the interrogation of those who were assessed to have value. Those who were assessed with no intel value were then detained by the MPs in general population holding areas. In addition to receiving targeted individuals, the detention center also received a large portion of detainees who were in the target area. While limited numbers of some of these detainees had some intelligent value, most did not. Initially, regardless of circumstance (target vs in the target area), none of these detainees were released from detention. Generally, the maneuver units thought they were a threat and should not be released (they would face them in combat action or other hostile incidents). As CJTF-7 stood up, it established a board system in which MI, MP, and JAG had "votes" on release of detainees. The MI brigade and Maneuver Units provided input to the board. The Brigade's focus on detainees was to process, interrogate and exhaust them of intelligence value and then coordinate for their placement into a general population holding area. On rare occasions MI would also nominate a detainee for release. The 205th conducted its initial detainee planning with the 18th MP Brigade, organic to V Corps. We did not initially coordinate with the 800th as they were TPFDeD to directly support CFLCC. We did not begin a working relationship with the 800th until CJTF-7 was established and the 800th became one of its subordinate units. Pre-conflict planning called for coordination between MI and the MPs on lanes in the road and responsibilities - the "how, when and what to do" in regards to detention and interrogation operations. This coordination and planning continued throughout the operation. While the locations of initial Corps detention centers were planned, their actual locations were ultimately determined by ground operations, rather than deliberate planning. Early-on detention operations and interrogation operations at Corps generally followed a model of tiered support. The maneuver brigades and divisions each conducting their own interrogation operations, but initially the Corps and Theater (CFLCC) operations were intertwined. CFLCC established interrogation operations at the Theater Internment Facility at Camp Bucca with the 323rd MI Bn, and a forward interrogation facility initially at Life Support Area (LSA) Bushmaster and subsequently at Camp Cropper (vic BIAP) with elements of the 202nd. The 205th initially had elements of the 519th (attached to the Brigade from the beginning of the war) imbedded into these early interrogation operations. As CJTF-7 established (14 Jun 03) the 205th took control of the 323rd and the interrogation operation at Camp Bucca. The 519th initially took full control of the interrogation operation at Camp Cropper, conducting both screening and interrogations. The screening operations became increasingly important and cumbersome as we initially experienced problems with most of the capturing units not providing capture tags or capture tags not filled out properly. COL Pappas and I talked to the Bn S-3s of 31D and 41D to get the Bn and Bde cages to do their job properly and after while there were improvements.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT

Springfield, VA

DATED 2004/05/29

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

In late July/early August CJTF-7 planned for a major operation aimed at capturing members of the Saddam Fedeyeen (SD). A lists of thousands of names, occupations and addresses of suspected SD personnel was translated and Operation Victory Bounty was planned to round them up. Planning called for placing these SD detainees at a location other than Cropper and to establish a concentrated interrogation effort which would specialize in obtaining detailed information on the SD. This resulted in the Brigade establishing a third interrogation effort at Abu Ghuraib (AG), which would be operated and manned by the 519th. The 325th took responsibility for continuing the operations at Cropper. During Operation Victory Bounty more than just suspected SD personnel were rounded up. Apparently maneuver elements corralled just about everyone in the vicinity of a SD suspect. After the personnel were sent to AG for screening and interrogation, we received a high amount of requests for information from CJTF-7. We very rapidly realized that we needed to send CJTF-7 a tailored daily report to address the high volume of information requirements. To ensure we were able to assist in answering one of CJTF-7's top PIR, it was nearly mandated that we stay on a script of questions, centering on whether or not there was a planned and centrally controlled insurgency working against us. We kept records and forwarded information to CJTF-7 of the number of detainees, the number screened, the number interrogated, the number determined to be SD as well as statistics on production. I kept copies of the reports in a folder titled "Victory Bounty" on my computer. This computer was turned over to the S3 of the 504th, which replaced the 205th in Iraq. The ACE might be another place where the information might be retained. When we moved elements of the 519th into AG, it was already partially occupied by other activities. There was a CPA controlled and operated civilian prison for Iraqi criminals and a CJTF-7 operated military internment facility which would process and hold personnel and then move them on to Bucca. CPA had begun to refurbish portions of the old Iraqi AG prison complex. The area being refurbish included two wings of 50 cells each which were suitable for isolation of detainees. We requested 50 of those cells for our use for Victory Bounty detainees. We eventually got use of the 50 cells, and later received CPA authorization to use both wings. The 205th and CJTF-7 both considered consolidation of interrogation facilities of the three widely spaced interrogation facilities into AG. This was driven for the most part by a need to achieve operating and manpower efficiencies. Overcrowding at Cropper and a plan to close Bucca also factored into the consolidation plan. In late Aug/early Sep at a meeting involving LTG Sanchez, COL Pappas and I, the decision was made to conduct the consolidation of the coalition interrogation facilities. The base plan involved the 800th MP Brigade conducting detainee operations and providing the detainee guard force. LTG Sanchez was informed that the consolidation plan would improve the interrogation process and increase intelligence output. In early Sept 03, [redacted] who was my Assistant S-3, and I met with the S-3s of the 519th, 325 and 323 to begin planning the consolidation. While I was TDY later in Sept, a decision was made to establish the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at AG. This decision was made to reflect the realities of what was actually occurring at AG - it was already a JIDC in everything but its name - there was an overriding mission set that in effect dictated what it was to become. The debriefing portion of the name was key, even if it reflected a capability if not an actuality. However, AG personnel were already accomplishing debriefings at locations other than AG and it was envisioned that debriefings as well as interrogations would be executed at AG in the future. What we conceived actually came into being. I suspect that LTG Sanchez may have been considering what was being done at GTMO even before MG Miller visited Iraq. I sense that in at least one conversation between LTG Sanchez and COL Pappas at which I was not present (I was TDY back in the States), the GTMO process was explored and discussed. MG Miller's visit and the follow-on assistance team from GTMO certainly cemented it. Based on the information obtained from the GTMO assistance team visit, we had additional discussions with MG Fast in which we looked at GTMO and how they were structured. We felt that we did not need the full GTMO infrastructure (mostly analytical and requirements management) support staff as that could be provided by the Coalition Analysis and Control Element. We submitted a request for forces (RFF) in order to establish a premier interrogation facility, which would include MPs for running the detention portion of the facility, a dog team to support MP operations, a behavioral science team, collection management and reports section, and additional analysis. We pursued the establishment of Interrogation "Tiger Teams" consisting of an interrogator and an analyst, supported by a linguist. The Tiger Teams were designed to be able to draw out information from detainees, process and report, analyze internally, and conduct research for further exploitation. We initially decided that we did not need a Bn structure at the JIDC. However we wanted a field grade officer to set the JIDC up and to serve as the operations officer. COL Pappas chose [redacted] to execute these responsibilities. I was in contact with [redacted] several times a day to discuss plans, requirements and other operational aspects of interrogation operations. He was informed that elements of the 519th, 325th and 323rd would be there to conduct interrogation operations but that there would not be a full staff; the Brigade HQs would provide staff support. By collapsing the other two interrogation facilities we were able to pull in all the subject matter expertise from the other locations into one place. Later on in late-Sep, [redacted] was selected to "run" the JIDC. As I understand how the situation developed, COL Pappas and the DCO met with MG Fast and [redacted] and a decision to place an O5 at the JIDC was made and MG Fast told [redacted] to assign [redacted] to COL Pappas for the purpose of running the JIDC. We eventually stood up a JIDC Headquarters Company to facilitate having a company commander on the ground responsible for the health, welfare, morale and discipline for the soldiers at the JIDC. The company was formed around personnel from the 323rd, who was also given responsibility to assist the company at the battalion level. The 323rd, however, was never put in charge of running the JIDC.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

AG0000504

DOD 000592

Statement of [REDACTED]

Taken at Springfield, VA

Date 2004/05/24

[REDACTED] Human Resources Command/OPMD, Alexandria.

VA 22332

[REDACTED] was supposed to run the JDIC. The soldiers saw [REDACTED] as the OIC and [REDACTED] as the Ops Officer. I spoke with [REDACTED] about his duties a couple of times, although the conversations mainly ended up being about soldier support issues (his initial effort centered around wanting sports equipment). I primarily dealt with [REDACTED] on the ops side of the house. As I understand it, [REDACTED] has a Civil Affairs/PSYOPS background. I am not aware if he had an Interrogation/JIDC background. I had to speak with him a couple of times about what his job was and what he should be doing - I had to tell him where his focus should be. I informed him that the Brigade Staff would take care of the soldier support things he seemed to be occupied with and to get on with running the JIDC. I soon realized that [REDACTED] was probably not the right officer for running the JIDC and mentioned that to COL Pappas. In hindsight, I did not express that strongly enough. [REDACTED] was sent to run the JIDC because the alternative would have been to have COL Pappas run it, which would have meant he would have been spending a disproportionate amount of time on an organization that represented about one eighth of his span of control. For a time there was consideration to move me out there; in fact I made a couple of visits for 24-48 hours at a time to work on some operational problems. [REDACTED] and I had frequent contact on the ops side and we felt we could make it work. [REDACTED] understood the Commander's intent. I did not have the authority to remove [REDACTED] and in fact he represented the J2, not the 205th. I don't want to suppose what COL Pappas was thinking initially, but I know that he eventually had his own concerns about [REDACTED] and eventually took action to coordinate his removal from the JIDC. In a session with LTG Sanchez there was a realization that the JIDC was still not where the CG wanted it and LTG Sanchez directed COL Pappas to move to AG. LTG Sanchez's reason for putting him there was to insure that interrogations were done LAW proper procedures - I assess that LTG Sanchez determined that he would feel better if COL Pappas, a Brigade Commander, answerable to him, was there overseeing interrogations, the Brigades #1 mission as specified by the CG. There was some turmoil at the JDIC. We realized that there were some disciplinary problems on the MPs side of the house which needed fixing. There was a struggle on the interrogation ops side of the house but we made it work. Some of the interrogators were upset at being extended in theater, at the ever changing mission, overcrowding at the facility, poor living conditions and the increasing threat from mortars and other attacks. There was poor discipline on the MPs side of the house, folks out of uniform, and disarray in the living and work spaces. Consideration was made to move the Brigade Headquarters to AG, but that would have meant the Bde Hqs would have spent most of the time running the JIDC at the cost of seven battalions--their operations, and their personnel. We attempted to balance the location and focus of the Bde leadership by having the Brigade Commander and a small TAC move to AG, while the DCO and I stayed at Victory to assist the commander in running the rest of the Brigade and to facilitate coordination with the CJTF-7 staff. COL Pappas had a good understanding of the situation, and understood what needed to happen in regards to moving to AG and taking over as the FOB Commander. The place was too vulnerable. COL Pappas had to take control and secure the facility. I took my Ops SGM there for a review the day after [REDACTED]

Initials of person making statement [REDACTED]

Page 3 of 5 [REDACTED]

AG0000505

DOD 000593

Statement of [REDACTED]

Taken at Springfield, VA

Date 2004/05/24

the FRAGO giving us the FOB came out. During that visit we took note of several security concerns--unauthorized folks having access, and local workers being too close to the JIDC work and life support areas for example. The FRAGO directed that COL Pappas have TACON of all tenant units at AG, provide force protection and security for the detainees. I understood that security for the detainees was essentially the same as providing force protection for the soldiers and US Government civilians and contractors. I did not assess that there was a specified or implied task for the 205th to run MP operations. In other words, the FRAGO did not entail the internal aspects of the confinement facility, the movement and control of detainees, care and feeding of the detainees and prisoners, or telling the MPs how to do their job in running the confinement facility. I think COL Pappas also had the same understanding. I never saw the FRAGO as meaning the 205th and COL Pappas were to be in total control of all internal aspects of AG. We were not MPs and not in their operational chain of command. I don't feel we usurped the MP Commander's responsibilities or authorities to train, manage, and conduct MP operations. If we took or directed action on certain aspects for force protection it was because they were not doing it, we sensed a void and needed to fill it in order to maintain security and force protection for all of the soldiers, civilians, and detainees located at AG. We had discussions with BG Karpinski, Commander of the 800th MP Bde. Prior to COL Pappas being given the FOB, our units had been TACON to the 800th MP Bde, but they wanted us to do their job in guarding the facilities, force protection, etc. We did not have the manpower to do so and simultaneously execute the interrogation mission--CJTF-7 agreed. When COL Pappas was given the FOB, 800th became TACON to us and we expected a lot from them. We sent the 165th MI Bn to AG to assist COL Pappas in running the FOB and to assist with FP. As we saw a greater need to take control of some of the MP operations to improve FP, we asked CJTF-7 for OPCON of the 800th MP assets at AG, but [REDACTED] (CJTF-7 DC3) said no - you don't need that - take charge of the FOB - I will talk to the Cdr of the 800th. I had continuing dialogues with BG Karpinski about differences between doctrine requirements and actual manpower. I also spoke to her Bde S3 about how we could improve FP, and on providing MP escorts to detainees being interrogated. We also discussed what TACON authorities we had been given and what was expected of them. It boiled down to them not having enough manpower. We jointly worked an RFF and the C3, MG Miller agreed to support getting contractors to do some MP functions for security and force protection, guard and escort detainees. None of the existing contracts allowed for that, so we had a new Statement of Work written; it was not approved before I departed the theater. [REDACTED]

Initials of person making statement [REDACTED]

Page 4 of 5 [REDACTED]

AG0000506

DOD 000594

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/05/24

B. STATEMENT (Continued)

There were two aspects of 205th taking over the FOB - insure that interrogation ops could be conducted in a safe and productive manner and running the physical plant of AG. We had always done the first and had to assume some of the second, but it did not entail telling the MPs how to do their MP functions. The MG Miller visit came while I was TDY. I never met or spoke with him. COL Pappas had a vision resulting from his discussions with LTG Sanchez and MG Miller. When the assistance team was there we mapped out a strategy, courses of action and an organizational design of what we needed for the JIDC and how to get there. We realized there were several differences between GTMO and AG. They had a consolidated MP and MI data base system which covered all aspects of controlling and exploiting detainees and fed into a National system. We did not, but needed a similar system. I started getting involved on the ops side and worked in getting the assets we needed-both systems and personnel, and getting to the JIDC for integration. I was involved in a couple of discussions on interrogation methods and concepts with MG Miller's folks but nothing out of the ordinary. The discussions raised nothing that we would question. They centered around items straight out of the manual and standard, accepted doctrine. My involvement in these discussions centered on ensuring the efficient execution (meeting the commander's intent) of the entirety of JIDC OPS of which interrogations was just one (albeit the most critical) part. At first there were no approved IROEs until [REDACTED] put them together, based on experience in Afghanistan. It resulted in 205th and CJTF-7 approved IROEs. I really did not get involved in the requests or approval for exceptions for the IROEs except for one time when I was the acting DCO. My experience had been limited to assisting in processing several 30-day extension of isolation, mostly while serving as the DCO. I knew that interrogators had to get permission to use dogs and to use sleep deprivation. I never saw a request or an approval for anything but isolation extension. As stated, however, they were not generally routed through me or the Bde S3 shop. I did not see, observe and was not informed of any abuse or humiliation of prisoners, pictures or videos, or use of dogs against detainees. I know that CL Pappas was reviewing some pictures that had been taken but was excluded from his office area while he was doing so. I was generally not involved in disciplinary matters. I was aware of the Article 15 given to the three soldiers over the drinking and interrogation incident. I was informed of the shooting incident immediately after it happened and knew that in the aftermath there were changes in our security procedures. I worked some of the resource issues for enhanced security. The OIC of the JIDC or the Ops Officer would decide who could get into the hard site. [REDACTED] kept a status board on detainees that we were working for interrogation and was supposed to control who went into the tents. However, the MPs often used our cell areas that were unoccupied for "trouble makers" from other areas, without our permission. OGA put their detainees in our area without fully identifying them to us - we knew they were there, accounted for as "OGA 1" or "OGA 2" etc. We tried to work a MOA with OGA and CJTF-7 about their use of our area and doing interrogations under our rules, but it was never accomplished. There was some sharing of intelligence from their interrogations, and our interrogators at times worked with them on interrogations. [REDACTED] and I discussed some of this and he gave me a comfort level that an appropriate level of coordination and oversight was taking place. I did not really get involved in the internal aspects of interrogation operations but dealt mainly with requirement, priorities, and resources. There was training and orientation for all incoming personnel - soldiers, civilians, contractors. It was aligned with training at GTMO and included ROEs, Geneva Convention and the like. We did not QC the contractors, but assumed that the SOW was sufficient for the company to provide quality, experienced and capable interrogators. We felt that the company did the vetting.

Q Is there anything else you would like to add?
 A. No, not at this time.

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [REDACTED]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24th day of May, 2004

at: McDermott, Springfield, VA

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

USAJ Article 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is OCS/SP5

LOCATION Building B30, Camp Victory, Iraq	DATE 12 June 2004	TIME 1347	FILE NUMBER
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [REDACTED]	GRADE/STATUS SPC/USA	
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 372nd Military Police, Camp Victory, Iraq			

[REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
 I reviewed several photographs of the alleged detainee abuse at Baghdad Central Corrections Facility, Iraq and was able to identify the following individuals assigned to the 372nd Military Police: Photograph labeled bac2d823a78949afbfa0886e66f746e9.jpg depicts a Titan linguist whose first name is [REDACTED] on the left. I do not recall his last name. The individual on the right is [REDACTED]. Photograph labeled [REDACTED] depicts [REDACTED] standing on the left of the photograph. Photograph labeled [REDACTED] depicts [REDACTED] standing to the right of the [REDACTED] handler in a tan cap. [REDACTED] is standing to the left of the detainee. [REDACTED] is standing to the right of [REDACTED]. The individual standing behind the bars on the left side of the photograph is an Iraqi Policeman, who name is unknown to me. Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement. A: NO ~~END OF STATEMENT~~




EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF <u>2</u> PAGES
<p>ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT [REDACTED] DATED [REDACTED] CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE [REDACTED] OF [REDACTED] PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.</p>		

AG0000508

DOD 000596

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] 27 MAY 2004 TELEPHONIC INTERVIEW

On 27 May 2004 the undersigned conducted a telephonic interview from our offices located in Metro Park, Alexandria, VA with [REDACTED] in Fort Huachuca, AZ. The purpose of this interview was to clarify details included in her 21 May 2004 sworn statement.

[REDACTED] reiterated she personally saw no detainees in Abu Ghraib who were nude or stripped of their clothing. She did not generally observe the in-processing of detainees but the few she did observe did not involve stripping of detainees. To her knowledge, such methods were not part of the in-processing protocol and "pat-down" searches were the standard. While stripping newly arrived detainees to facilitate the search for contraband and weapons was the norm in Afghanistan she opined it was not employed at Abu Ghraib because the job would have been too overwhelming, they didn't have sufficient numbers of prison uniforms to issue the detainees, and there was not sufficient space or resources to securely accomplish the task. [REDACTED] did not observe any detainee nudity associated with interrogations. Question: Did you observe any nudity at Abu Ghraib? Answer: "I don't think so... unless it was used as an incentive (interrogation) to get clothes back. I don't recall and didn't see any (nudity). She added that the Interrogation Rules of Engagement made it possible to strip a detainee but would have to be requested and any such request would go through her or her Operations Officer, [REDACTED] and she never saw any. Her interrogators had also been instructed not to make any direct request or give any directions to the MPs; all requests from MI to the MPs were directed to go through [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] worked for [REDACTED]. He conducted initial MI screening of detainees during in-processing to Abu Ghraib to determine MI interest and recommend detainees for MI hold status and internment in Tier 1A. He worked with CACI linguists conducting screenings of paperwork to "narrow the field" and then quick interviews to further narrow those designated as MI hold. [REDACTED] voiced no objection to additional questions and provided her cell phone [REDACTED] and office phone [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]
LTC, MI
TF-FAY, CJTF7

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Metro Park Springfield, VA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/21	3. TIME 1945	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS CPT	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A/304TH Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Huachuca, AZ

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I have been assigned to the 519th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (BN) since 01 May 2000. I deployed to Afghanistan for six months with A Company, 519th MI BN on 20 Jul 02. I served as the Operations Officer of interrogation operations at a facility in Bagram until I redeployed on 28 Jan 03. I then deployed to Kuwait on 12 Mar 04, with HHS, 519th MI BN where I served as the Battle Captain/Assistant S-3. I crossed into Iraq on 4 Apr 04, first arriving at LSA Bushmaster, to conduct initial coordination with the 720th Military Police (MP) Battalion who was establishing a detainee facility or "cage". I remained at Bushmaster for approximately 12 days. I then moved forward to LSA Dogwood, where the 720th MP BN established a second cage, and I remained there for 10 days to two weeks at the end of Apr 03. I moved to Camp Speicher (North Tikrit) where the 519th MI BN established its Headquarters. From early May to early June, I served as the 519th MI Bn Liaison Officer to the 4th ID for Tactical Humint Operations. During the June timeframe, I served at the Camp Cropper detention facility as the Senior Intelligence Officer and battalion level representative for the 519th. In early July, I returned to Camp Speicher as a Battle Captain, and it was shortly after returning to Speicher that the 519th received the Warning Order to establish interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib (AG) in support of the upcoming operation Victory Bounty. On or about 23 Jul 03, I was a member of the 519th MI Bn site survey team to conduct an assessment of the AG facility and then returned to Camp Speicher. Due to the overwhelming requests for updates, [REDACTED] requested additional higher level assistance from the 519th MI Bn so that he could focus on his company command duties and to provide much necessary life support. I arrived at AG on 4 August, and my position was as the Interrogation OIC responsible for supervising the interrogation operations and personnel. I was responsible for screening, interrogations, and reporting of intelligence information. I departed Iraq on 4 Dec 03 on "Rest and Relaxation" leave and unexpectedly received redeployment orders while on leave. I returned to Kuwait to out-process on 24 December 2003 and departed Kuwait 25 December en-route to Fort Bragg. I never returned to AG. While at Camp Cropper, I had various conversations with my two warrant officers, [REDACTED] interrogation ops, and [REDACTED] the Operations Officer. All were frustrated with the overcrowded conditions at the Cropper detention facility. For example, the facility was intended to house approximately 200 detainees, and there were anywhere from 700 to 1,000 detainees. Many of the detainees were brought to Cropper for minor infractions, and most of the detainees were "low value detainees". Several detainees were what was referred to as "50 meters detainees", because they had been in the general vicinity of the target of a US raid and had been picked up essentially for being in close proximity. The "low value detainees" did not warrant long term interrogation effort or retention, and Cropper lacked facilities for proper interrogation operations. The conditions were similar at the facilities at Bushmaster and Dogwood. Bushmaster and Dogwood did not have sufficient logistical support - for example there were no tents for detainees and water was rationed. Cropper, however, had tents, which were routinely overcrowded. [REDACTED] voiced his concerns with the overpopulation and the disgruntled mood of the detainees with no response. He published an Information Intelligence Report (IIR) in an effort to alert leadership of the situation and the problems within the facility. I am prior enlisted and served for ten years as an Interrogator/HUMINT Collector (MOS 97E) and am qualified as a "Strategic Debriefier". As a Commissioned Officer, I have served in various positions involving tactical HUMINT Collection Operations. I served as a Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) Leader in Bosnia-Herzegovina for six months (SFOR-8), as an Analysis and Control Team (ACT) leader in Bosnia (SFOR 9), and as an Interrogation operations officer in Afghanistan with the 519th MI BN for six months. I consider myself very knowledgeable of Interrogation Operations and techniques. With the exception of what I discuss below, during my time in Iraq, I never witnessed any interrogation methods or operations that were outside normal procedures and observed nothing contrary to Army Field Manuals, Regulations, Doctrine, or the established curriculum presented at the 97E MOS producing school at the US Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, AZ. The interrogation environment in Iraq was challenging because the current US Army interrogation training and doctrine is rooted in and geared toward a conventional, cold war threat and not toward the Arab mindset. When I arrived at AG, there were approximately 50 to 150 inmates being held on criminal offenses. The 72nd MP Company was manning AG and was significantly undermanned and under resourced. The 519th received the mission for AG in late July, when AG was designated as the detention facility for individuals detained during Operation VICTORY BOUNTY (OVB). OVB was a nation-wide sweep to pick up approximately 1,800 [REDACTED]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF [REDACTED] PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

[REDACTED] and the 320th MP Battalion started operations there about the same time. While the military constructed a mass holding area (Holding area GANCI), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was simultaneously renovating the hard-site within AG prison. There was no suitable location to establish an interrogation facility and operations area. The 519th established the interrogation and administrative area in the vicinity of Holding Area VIGILANT, using a ARFABs, DRASH tents. The 205th MI BDE coordinated with the CPA to utilize 10 cells of cell block "1A". As a result of the renovation effort, Iraqi National workers employed for the CPA sponsored renovations utilized the courtyard immediately next to cell block 1A as a center of gravity for their welding and construction operation. The 519th initially used the outside portions of AG, not the hard site, due to the ongoing renovation project. The 205th MI BDE, specifically [REDACTED] COL PAPPAS, [REDACTED] were Bde battle captains and constantly requested updates.) kept pressuring the 519th to utilize the hard-site, but the site was not acceptable for use until about three weeks after our arrival (3rd week in Aug 03) because of the following reasons: the proximity of the construction workers could allow communication with detainees, insufficient numbers of MPs to guard detainees housed in the area, the MPs did not have locks, and the wing did not have electricity or running water. Camp Ganci was constructed within the confines of AG as an outside, main holding facility intended to hold up to 4000 "criminal detainees". Camp Vigilant was an outside facility intended to house general population of "security detainees". Although AG had been designated as the repository of the OVB detainees, we received only approximately 180 OVB detainees. Of those, approximately 62 were on the original list of 1,800, and only about 20 provided information, and that information was not particularly "actionable intelligence". About two weeks into OVB, AG started receiving "security detainees" from operations other than OVB and mission creep began as AG started becoming a general security detainee facility and eventually became the central, consolidated detention facility. I did not believe AG was the best place to use as a central facility, and during a meeting focused on consolidating assets on at AG in late Aug 03 with [REDACTED] (Co Cdr, 325th MI Bn), and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (325th MI Bn Commander), I voiced concerns about the defensibility of the facility, man-power shortage, location, and the stigma attached to AG. On or about 2 Sep 03, MG Miller and representatives from the Joint Task Force (JTF) at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba, arrived at AG. It appeared that LTG Sanchez was not satisfied with the amount of actionable intelligence resulting from the interrogation operations at AG, and he had requested MG Miller review and assess the AG operations and provide recommendations learned from the detention facility at JTF-GTMO. I had discussions with MG Miller on a couple of occasions and these conversations centered on renovations and improvements of the facilities, challenges of interrogation operations, and the need for increased MP/MI cooperation. Specifically, I recall he discussed the implementation of dedicated MP support to MI. The purpose of dedicated MP support, for example, was to transport detainees to the designated interrogation booth, observe detainees while in holding and provide feedback to the interrogators. I never discussed specific methods or techniques with MG MILLER. The JTF-GTMO focus was more strategic than the tactical screening and operational environment of Iraq, and I believed the JTF-GTMO model could not be replicated in the Iraqi environment and experience. Although I attempted to express the concept, I do not know if MG MILLER understood my position and he appeared to press forward with his JTF-GTMO recommendations. I recommended a central facility could be constructed at Camp Speicher rather than AG, however I understood the reason behind the decision was an immediate demand for a facility. I never saw the final Miller Report, no [REDACTED]

Initials of Person Making Statement [REDACTED]

Page 4 of 9 Page [REDACTED]

AG0000511

DOD 000599

[REDACTED] received any direct feedback as a result of the visit. The only feedback I saw was from the 205th following the recommendations from MG MILLER's visit. I do believe that the Miller visit propelled AG to become a "mini-mo". Shortly after MG MILLER departed AG, [REDACTED] arrived at AG on approximately 10 September, approximately the same time as the 325th MI Bn personnel. He was the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) to AG. I believe [REDACTED] role was to be the 205th representative at AG, provide guidance, and implement a mandate from COL PAPPAS and [REDACTED] to replicate the JTF-GTMO model in the form of the Joint Detention and Interrogation Center (JDIC) at AG, beginning with the introduction of the Tiger Team interrogation concept and strategic level collection (knowledgeability briefs, for example). Prior to [REDACTED] arrival, I had one chief warrant officer and approximately 12 active duty HUMINT collectors (97E, 97B), an analyst and a Trojan communications team working for me. I continued to send operational reporting through the 519th MI Bn Tactical Humint Operations (THOPS) to the 205th MI Bn and COL PAPPAS. It was at this time (10 September) that the interrogator personnel from the 325th MI began arriving and the process of merging the 519th and 325th MI assets began. The 325th initially sent five "Tiger Teams", with one interrogator and one analyst per team. Because I needed leaders for the new arrivals, I pulled one NCO from the five teams to act as a section leader. To facilitate the integration of the 519th and 325th, I then broke up the original teams and merged the personnel of the two units. As the 519th did not have analytical assets, the reorganization benefited the collection mission. The resulting structure was four sections with an NCO in charge of each, and at least one analyst per section. This organization did not follow the "GTMO Model" and I receive pressure from the 205th leadership to maintain an interrogator/analyst structure. I believe the structure implemented (two collectors per team and analytical support to the entire section) was more efficient and effective for our operational working environment and available manning. After the close of Cropper (approximately 5-7 days later), the 325th provided additional personnel who became the Operations section. [REDACTED] arrived at AG on or about 15 Sep 03 and I understood him to be the "new boss". His original title was "Chief of JDIC", but he stated that he did not like the title and changed it to "Director of JDIC". I understood that [REDACTED] was in charge of the JDIC at AG. [REDACTED] was fairly uninvolved with interrogation operations within AG and never provided interrogation guidance, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), or directives, probably because he was not overly familiar with interrogation operations. At the end of Sep 03 (I do not recall the exact date), the first of the CACI contracted civilian interrogators [REDACTED] arrived. Although I had been told to eventually expect contract augmentees, the three CACI contractors arrived out of the blue. I never received official guidance or perimeters from higher as to how to employ them. I briefly interviewed each contractor, provided in-brief information, and standards of conduct and interrogation rules of engagement and paired them up with a military interrogator since I knew my soldiers capabilities but did not know that of the contractors. At this time I created a three to four page initial counseling statement which each contractor signed. The statement essentially covered the standards of conduct, performance expectations, informed them of the military chain of command and to whom to report any incidents, operational security awareness. About five days later, seven more CACI contractors arrived, and then one's and two's arrived periodically over the next couple of months. I presented each CACI contractor with a new arrival briefing and had each sign an initial counseling statement and acknowledge his understanding of the operation and IROE [REDACTED] a contractor who arrived in the second group of seven [REDACTED]

Statement of [REDACTED]

Taken At MetroPark, Springfield, VA

Date 2004/05/21

[REDACTED] contractors, was the CACI "site manager" at AG, and became my POC for CACI issues and personnel. I relied heavily on [REDACTED] to manage the CACI personnel and I did not personally interview each contractor individually and knew very little about their qualifications, trusting that higher echelons had validated their qualifications. Most contractors had prior military or police experience. I basically would rely on [REDACTED] my military section chief, [REDACTED] feedback from section leaders and interrogations to judge a contractor's abilities and qualifications. I had only one performance issue with a CACI analyst [REDACTED] the analyst continually interjected and attempted to dominate the interrogation. I discussed this issue with [REDACTED] and the analyst was relocated to another section within the JIDC. [REDACTED] 323rd MI Bn (I believe his original unit is within the Utah National Guard), arrived approximately 30 Sep (very unsure of the date, after the mortar attack on 20 Sep and about the same time we began using the hardsite room for interrogation operations) after [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had arrived. He had been the OIC/SIO at Camp Bucca. When Camp Bucca closed its collection mission, the 205th brought 323rd asserts to AG as part of the centralization process. The majority of 323rd personnel became the Command and Control/staff/headquarters element and were not used in interrogation operations. [REDACTED] 323rd MI, became the screening OIC and [REDACTED] became the CM&D NCOIC. [REDACTED] (originally from the 141st MI, Utah National Guard) attached to the 323rd MI BN, became the Headquarters Commander. [REDACTED] became the Operations Officer and I worked closely with him. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] worked closely together. I took most guidance from [REDACTED] who provided oversight to the interrogation operation. During this time period, COL PAPPAS's visits increased from visiting every week or two, to 2-3 visits a week, to occasional overnights, until late mid Nov mid he moved out to AG. At the beginning of Nov 03, LTG SANCHEZ and MG FAST visited AG for a briefing and to assess the situation. This was the second visit to AG LTG Sanchez made following the 20 Sep mortar attack. The first was on approximately 30 September, when LTG Sanchez's focus was primarily the force protection and defensive posture of AG. LTG Sanchez toured the entire facility, to include a short brief on interrogation operations, which took place in the building recently acquired for use by the JIDC. LTG Sanchez expressed concern about the interrogation operation to COL PAPPAS and indicated that the issue would be further discussed "later". Shortly after the second visit in November, LTG SANCHEZ issued a FRAGO on 19 Nov 03, which appointed COL PAPPAS as the FOB Commander, giving him responsibility for all assigned at AG. In discussion with COL PAPPAS, it was my opinion that this was not a good situation and that there should remain a clear delineation between MI and MP, and that COL PAPPAS should recommend against the appointment. I believed that MI should not become involved in detainee or prison operations. As a result of the OPORD, my understanding was that COL PAPPAS would take control of AG security and force protection, but not "warden responsibilities". After the OPORD, COL PAPPAS assigned AG Force Protection responsibility to [REDACTED], 165th MI BN Commander. [REDACTED] was a good choice because of his tactical knowledge, and he brought in fragments of the 165th Long Range Surveillance (LRS) Company to provide a more robust force protection posture and guidance than the MP could provide. The MPs had had many breaches of security and poor installation access control, and frequently allowed private vehicles and taxis on the base without escort. The FRAGO generated tension between MI and the MPs. The MP chain of command pulled the MP detail dedicated to MI for transportation of detainees between their holding area and the interrogation booths. By this time, Camp Vigilant and the hard site (Block 1A and 1B) were overcrowded, so security [REDACTED]

Initials of Person Making Statement [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] detainees and MI Holds were put in to Camp Ganci and thus scattered throughout all three AG sites. By the time of my departure, the AG population had swollen to about 6,500, and locating and rounding up detainees for interrogation became problematic. With the pulling of the MP detail, the interrogators had to track down and transport the detainees themselves, wasting a considerable amount of valuable time. The MPs also pulled the MP overwatch from the interrogations, putting the interrogators at greater risk. For clarification purposes, a "Security Detainee" was an individual perceived to be a threat to Coalition Force, i.e. detained for weapons possessions, IED involvement, etc. An "MI Hold" is anyone of interest to MI and can include a Security Detainee. This category would also include Al Qaeda types, individuals possessing information regarding foreign fighters, infiltration methods, or pending attacks on Coalition Forces. A "Criminal Detainee" is, as the name indicates, an individual simply involved in criminal activities unrelated to Coalition Forces. All three groups were treated equally. Our interrogation approaches and selected techniques were driven by the individuals circumstances of capture and placement/access, and not determined by their status as one of these categories. The "hard site" consisted of Cell Block "1A" and "1B" as two man cells, and several other wings which were utilized as they became available, which were 4 or 8 man cells. The hard site, like the rest of AG, was under MP control. MI had no say so or influence over inmates or activities in Cell Block 1B, which primarily housed criminal female and juvenile inmates or any of the 4/8 man cell wings. Cell Block "1A" was primarily designated as the holding area for "Security Detainees" and "MI Holds". While the MPs controlled "1A", MI requested and had influence over who would be placed and housed in "1A". "1A" consisted of 40 cells, situated on two levels, with twenty cells on either side of a central corridor. Each cell had two bunks, but efforts were made to have only one detainee at a time in each cell. No detainee could be kept in "1A" longer than 30 days without LTG Sanchez approving an extension. If I, or one of my interrogators, wanted a detainee to remain in "1A" longer than 30 days, the interrogator would write up a justification and request, forwarded from the section leader to myself, which I would forward up through the 205th MI BN for LTG Sanchez's approval. We maintained an electronic dossier folder on each detainee of MI interest, and I placed the approval request and final approval documents in the affected detainee's e-file. The final signed copies were placed in the detainee's paper dossier. Although "1A" was primarily designated as an MI holding area, on occasion, the MPs placed other detainees in "1A". These might include unruly or "problem" detainees and detainees of interest to CID or OGA. However, "1A" was never so crowded that we could not get a cell for an MI detainee. I did not, nor did any other MI personnel to my knowledge, track non-MI detainees for status or release after 30 days, as they were not my responsibility. The MPs were the "inn keepers", specifically an MP [REDACTED]. We began interrogation operations at AG using accepted Field Manual 34-52 norms and techniques. We were moving from a tactical to an operational or insurgent environment and it increasingly felt to me like my experience in Afghanistan. I did not want my folks to loose sight of their boundaries and their left and right limits. I saw the situation moving to the "Bagram" model. Pressures were increasing from overpopulation, the mission creep from bona fide Security Detainees to others who probably really didn't need to be detained for a long period, and the realization that Iraq was evolving into a long standing mission. I increasing felt the need to draw on my experience in Afghanistan. We had used "sleep adjustment" and "stress positions" as effective techniques in Afghanistan. Although I never saw written authorization, the techniques had SJA and CJTF-180 C-2X / C2 review and approval on a case by case basis. Because we had used the techniques in Afghanistan, and I perceived the Iraq experience to be evolving into the same [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
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operational environment as Afghanistan, I used my best judgment and concluded they would be effective tools for interrogation operations at AG. Because the winds of war were changing, and the mounting pressure from higher for "actionable intelligence" from interrogation operations, I requested more options that FM 34-52 provided. [REDACTED] acquired a copy of TF-121 IROE and essentially "plagiarized" it, changing the letterhead on the MFR, incorporating some general editing, and then submitted the IROE MFR for approval through the 519th MI BN to the 205th MI BDE for approval. [REDACTED] never received a response. Shortly after my arrival, I resent the IROE MFR request to the 205th cc'd the 519th MI Bn. I received no response and again sent out the document to the CJTF-7 C-2X shop. I discussed the issue with [REDACTED] at the C-2 shop, and he opined that the approval should be sent up through command channels rather than intelligence channels. While the MFR was being staffed, we continued to use FM-34-52 procedures, as well as sleep management and stress positions from our experience in Afghanistan, as I believed these to be reasonable, given the similarity of the situation. However, at AG, sleep management was requested only a few times, and it never exceeded the limit of 72 hours. Stress positions were used a little more frequently, but always in a very controlled manner. All usages of these techniques were documented in Interrogation Plans. Due to the fact the interrogations were conducted in open tents, anyone could observe the actions conducted therein. Concerning administration of the sleep management prior to the actual interrogation, the MPs implemented the procedure. The MPs would keep the detainees awake by saying "stand up" or "wake up". I did not, nor did any MI personnel to my knowledge, have a conversation or provide written instruction to the MPs as to how to exactly implement the procedure. No MP ever inquired of me as to how the procedure should be implemented. Concerning the administration of stress positions, interrogators could not utilize a stress positions for more than a total of 45 minutes within a given four hour period (meaning the total time a detainee could be in any stress position could not exceed 45 minutes. That did not mean one position could be held for 45 minutes, then move to another position for another 45 minutes.) The time keeping was the responsibility of the two interrogators in the booth, so I can not say for certain that these limitations were not exceeded. However, I never received any reports of excessive use of the technique. The next milestone in the effort to have the IROE approved. On or about 25 Aug 03, two Coalition lawyers [REDACTED] (Australia) (I am not 100% sure of the US SJA rep's name.), came to AG as a result of providing the IROE draft to [REDACTED] and requesting assistance and feedback. They came to AG to review operations. The lawyers informed me that my IROE MFR seemed to be within legal purview and authority, and the Australian lawyer even commented that the techniques were rather soft. They indicated the IROE MFR would be pushed higher for CJTF-7 review. The Miller Tiger Team arrived at AG on 2 Sep 03, and remained at AG for three to four full days. On the second day, I participated in a meeting with several members of the Miller Team, COL PAPPAS, and maybe [REDACTED]. It was during that meeting that the Team had a copy of my IROE MFR and someone from the team stated that it was a "good start", but that CJTF7 should consider something along the lines of what's approved for use in CJTF-170, although no specific tools or techniques were discussed. Shortly thereafter, on 10 Sep 03, the CJTF-7 MFR providing IROE (possibly the result of my MFR and the CJTF-170 approved IROE) was signed. I do not recall seeing a copy of the 10 September, however was provided a copy of the 14 September IROE. At about the same time, on or about 10 Sep 03, the 325th MI BN arrived and I began the integration of the 519th and 325th personnel. During a shift change meeting which included both 519th and 325th personnel, I handed out copies of the 14 Sep IROE approval MFR [REDACTED]

Initials of Person Making Statement [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] interrogators took turns reading the MFR aloud as others followed along. I am 90% certain that all interrogators and analysts read the IROE MFR, while it is possible due to sick call or some other reason, that some might have missed the meeting. I had each soldier sign a roster stating that he or she had read and understood the IROE. I also created a slide which synopsised the 14 September IROE and posted the IROE in numerous locations throughout the working area as a constant reminder. This original slide contained three columns - the first column general interrogation techniques IAW FM 34-52. Techniques outside of the FM were placed in a second column which I titled "OIC approval required prior to use", this was to ensure the interrogators did not have 'carte blanche', and sought guidance with more involved approaches. The third column was titled "CG's approval required for use on EPW's". After the subsequent IROE MFR was signed by LTG Sanchez on 12 Oct 03, I created a second slide to reflect the changes from the 14 September to the 12 October IROEs. Within the body of the main memorandum, it stated that any approach not listed in the policy required the CG's signature. It was explained to me (I cannot remember by who, but the guidance was from higher) that those approaches removed from the 14 Sep version were not necessarily out of reach, that they had to be approved by the CG prior to use. I therefore placed those approaches which were removed were placed under the title "Requires CG's approval in writing". In retrospect, the phrase "all other approaches require the CG's approval" would have been better verbage. This slide was posted about the interrogation operations room about the same time as the CACI contractors arrived. Following the incident involving three soldiers conducting unauthorized activities within IB, I drafted a "memorandum of understanding" in MFR format (approximately 20 Oct) which not only outlined the approaches approved for use, but also added that all interrogations will be conducted in a humane manner, interrogations involving female detainees required another female's presence, detainees will not be maliciously humiliated, detainees will not be touched in an unwanted or malicious manner, cultural boundaries will be respected, unscheduled interrogations will not be conducted and the understanding of these rules and the requirement to report any violations of these rules to the OIC. I had each member of the JIDC who was in contact with detainees, which included interrogators, analysts, contractors and interpreters, read the MFR and sign indicating their understanding. The IROE has always applied to other agencies as well and I mandated that if other agencies wished to use AG facilities, they were required to follow US Army IROE. Other agency reps were requested to also sign the IROE prior to any interview beginning approximately the beginning of November. COL PAPPAS told me that the CJTF-7 CG delegated to him the authority to approve sleep deprivation and sleep management, but I do not recall if he specifically stated he had received authority to approve use of stress positions. The IROE slide was posted prior to COL PAPPAS's arrival at AG on 16 Nov 03 (in preparation for taking command of the FOB on 19 Nov 03), and there was a conflict between the IROE slide, which stated these techniques required CG's approval, and COL PAPPAS's claim that he had the authority to approve such techniques. COL PAPPAS never stated to me the basis of that authority other than to state that the CG had delegated it to him. I never saw anything in writing granting that authority. Regarding my experience with OGA, I first had limited contact with OGA while at Cropper. It was during the end of Aug 03/beginning of Sep 03 timeframe, everyone started shifting their operations to AG. OGA occasionally coordinated for interrogation space. I instructed OGA representatives that they must abide by the Army IROE while at AG. Most of my contact was with an individual we knew only as [REDACTED] who appeared to be in charge of the OGA interrogation operations. I never endorsed the practice of "overnight parking" of OGA "ghost" detainees and expressed my disapproval to COL PAPPAS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] but I was overridden. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] then authorized several interrogations be conducted without the presence of Army interrogators and I did not have visibility or knowledge of what transpired during those interrogations. At the beginning to mid Oct 03, [REDACTED] as one of my interrogators sat in on their interrogations. This responsibility was picked up by the operations section, and any other agency requesting to conduct operations at AG coordinated with OPS. It was shortly thereafter that an incident occurred in which an OGA "ghost" detainee died during the course of an interrogation. JIDC personnel were not present during this interrogation. I have no knowledge of any OGA abuses or violations. The practice of housing "ghosts" continued and was still in practice at the time of my departure on 4 Dec 03, and I do not know if LTG Sanchez was aware of the practice or no [REDACTED]

NOT

USED
[REDACTED]

Initials of Person Making Statement [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
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STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Springfield, VA

DATED 2004/05/21

STATEMENT (Continued)

[REDACTED] the first officer in the "interrogation chain". I was comfortable that my subordinates knew their boundaries and believed they would have informed me of any violations or infringements of the IROE or any abuses they might witness. I did not have any concerns about any specific subordinates. The first incident of abuse of which I was aware was the "unauthorized interrogation" incident in early Oct 03. I was notified the following morning and only have second hand knowledge. Three soldiers [REDACTED] were involved in an incident at about 0200 when the three soldiers conducted an unscheduled interrogation of a female criminal detainee in Cell Block "1B", who was not an MI Hold. CID investigated the incident, but I never saw the report. All three soldiers were immediately removed from JIDC duties, received Article 15 punishment under UCMJ and were reduced in rank. [REDACTED] immediate corrective action was to call a mass formation the next morning at which all personnel were present. He informed me formation that there had been an "altercation" and "unauthorized interrogation". He stated that "such action won't be tolerated", and reiterated the JIDC mission. The second incident of inappropriate actions during interrogation of which I was aware involved [REDACTED] during the first or second week of Nov 03. She had submitted an Interrogation Plan in which the primary approach was the "direct approach", but I do not recall her secondary approach plan. I gathered that [REDACTED] viewed the detainee as having a flippant attitude in response to her questioning, perhaps not cooperating because she was female. She then decided to strip the detainee and apparently did so down to his underwear. [REDACTED] who was the analyst sitting in on the interview passed a note to [REDACTED] in which he asked her "are you sure you can do this which she replied "yes". After the interrogation, the inmate was escorted semi-naked back to VIGILANT. [REDACTED] overheard MPs talking about the incident and inquired as to what happened and immediately reported the incident to [REDACTED] as section leader, to [REDACTED] who confronted [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] claimed that she did not know she had done anything wrong. [REDACTED] notified me, and I in turn informed COL PAPPAS and [REDACTED]. I recommended that [REDACTED] receive an Article 15 to both COL PAPPAS and [REDACTED] but she merely received a written reprimand from [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] interrogation NCOIC, recommended she be returned back to her parent unit for the non-compliance. [REDACTED] were immediately removed from interrogation duties and re-assigned within the JIDC. I was not aware of any incidents of abuse involving [REDACTED].

I was not present for any visits to AG by the International Red Cross. I heard after the fact that they had visited, but I have no knowledge of the results or findings of those visits. Such visits would have been coordinated with the MPs. I was unaware of any incident involving administering cold showers to detainees, or the throwing of cold water on naked detainees, possibly in support of sleep deprivation efforts. I was unaware of any incident in which a naked detainee was forced to stand on a box with a hood over his head holding bottles in outstretched hands. I walked through the hard site, more often during the day or early evening hours than in the late hours of the night, but I never saw or heard of any naked detainees or any incidents involving women's underwear.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?

A. No.

////////////////////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////////////////////

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 9. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 21 day of MAY, 2004 at Metro Park, Springfield, VA

[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION METRO PARK SPRINGFIELD, VA
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/06/01
3. TIME 1245
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
6. SSN
7. GRADE/STATUS ES
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 1 MI Bn, 205 MI Bde, Wiesbaden, GE APO AE 09096

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived in Abu Ghraib, Iraq on 7 Nov 04 as a member of a five person analyst requirement from the 1st MI Bn, 205th MI Bde, Wiesbaden, GE. Upon our arrival, we were given a tour of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). We were also briefed on the Rules of Engagement (IROE) and the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) by the head of the JIDC. We were told that anything above the IROE was against the Geneva Convention. I also signed a memorandum stating that I understood the IROE. The next day, the 1st MI Bn personnel were assigned to their positions. I was first assigned the to Force Protection section and subsequently to a Special Project Team, which ultimately consisted of up to 10 Tiger Teams. During my deployment I worked with three interrogators (a CACI contract interrogator) and (DJ) (a CACI contract interrogator). On around 14 Dec 03, immediately following the capture of Sadaam Hussein, I was moved to the Special Project Team (SPT). The mission of the SPT was to interrogate important Iraqi personnel. Around 15 or 16 Dec 03, the Tiger Teams were called together about 2100 - 2130 by COL Pappas who told us that anything listed on the IROE has been "pre-approved" by LTG Sanchez. From the time I was moved to the SPT till the time I left Abu Ghraib, I worked with an Iraqi general assigned to us for interrogation. On one occasion, we were in the process of transferring from his cell to the shower facility. It was decided to transport from his cell to the shower facility (which was just upstairs from his cell) in the nude. resisted the MP's when they tried to handcuff him and was wrestled to the ground and forcibly handcuffed. Nothing else of note happened concerning this situation. On another occasion, when I went to the 1A block to sign out, I observed four or five detainees, hooded with sandbags, handcuffed and lying on the floor outside of cells. I asked what they were doing and was told by the MP guard that they were new arrivals who were awaiting cell assignments. As I was standing there, one of the detainees tried to adjust the sandbag on his head so he could see. The guard moved the detainee's hand aside and told the detainee "How many times do I have to tell you to stop trying to move your hood. If you do it again, you are really going to hate me." The guard mentioned that they were going to "break these guys in properly" and did I want to "watch the show". I did not know what he meant and did not think anything about it. I did not observe any abuse of the prisoners at that time; nor did I know the names of the MPs. Although I heard rumors, I never personally witnessed an interrogator using a dog in the interrogation booth. Our team would occasionally walk a detainee past the MP desk where the dog handler would be stationed. This was not pre-coordinated with the MP dog handler as the MP and dog were already stationed at the point. I understood that in order to use this or any other procedure listed in the IROE, you had to have permission. Our team would discuss which procedure we were going to use, fill out a form, and submit it to the section leader. The section leader would then secure the appropriate level of authorization and then give us the authorization to proceed. I think the authorizations would go through COL Pappas to LTG Sanchez for approval. Our team used sleep deprivation on occasion; we were informed by ICE operations that the procedure had been approved, but I do not know at what level. After getting the approval, the MP's were in charge of making sure the sleep deprivation schedule was maintained. The methods the MP's used to keep the detainees awake included making them stand up while handcuffed to the cell door. The MP's would also on occasion play loud music in the cell to keep the detainee awake. I was in the 1A and 1B sections of the facility at least twice a day during by time at Abu Ghraib and I never witnessed any physical abuse or humiliation. I heard that on one occasion a detainee was walked naked between camps as a form of humiliation, but I did not witness this first hand. once told a detainee if he did not cooperate during the interrogation that he would move him to an isolation cell and make him wear pink underwear. This did not occur and I did not observe any detainees wearing women's underwear. However from the way mentioned it to the detainee, I sort of had the impression that it might have been done at some time or another. had the reputation of being a harsh interrogator and would give the detainee the impression that they should not mess with him. He would start the interrogation process with new detainees by having them sit on the floor and tell them that they had to earn the privilege of being allowed to sit in a chair by cooperating. I never saw him abuse or humiliate a detainee. I never saw him use dogs in an interrogation. I left Abu Ghraib on 7 Feb 04. Q: Is there anything you wish to add? A: No

END OF STATEMENT

10 EXHIBIT 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT PAGE 1 OF PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

AG0000519

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Springfield, VA

DATED 2004/06/01

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT

USED

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 301. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 1 day of June 2004 at Springfield, VA

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

5 USC 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE [REDACTED] OF [REDACTED] PAGES

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CJTF7-TF-FAY

9 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephonic Interview [REDACTED]

1. (FOUO) On 9 June 2004, the undersigned conducted a telephonic interview with [REDACTED] was a surgeon assigned to Abu Ghraib from mid December 2003 to March 2004. He was the chief of the medical team responsible for treatment of security detainees. [REDACTED] explained there were three separate medical teams at Abu Ghraib. An Iraqi medical team was responsible for the criminal detainees, an Air Force team was responsible for the MI Holds, and his Army team was responsible for security detainees. While housed in the same facility there was no mission cross-over and he had little visibility of or interaction with other teams, their physicians, or staffs. [REDACTED] Air Force counterpart (MI Hold) was [REDACTED] an Army CPT who was promoted to Major while there. [REDACTED] arrived in late December 2003 after [REDACTED] could not recall the names of any other medical personnel. He never observed or heard of any detainee abuse or saw any injuries which he suspected as abuse. He opined that most medical files would be quite "thin." Few records were kept and everyone was overworked. Additionally, the 28th Combat Army Surgical Hospital (CASH) assigned their own hospital number to track their patients vice using the detainee's ISN, making it difficult to match medical treatments to detainee intelligence files.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[REDACTED]
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AG0000521

DOD 000609

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CJTF7-TFF-1 (Abu Ghraib)

5 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Negative Results Photograph Identification

1. (FOUO) On 5 June 2004, [REDACTED], SGT, USA; SSi [REDACTED] currently assigned to the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC), Baghdad Central Corrections Facility, Iraq; reviewed the photographs of alleged detainee abuse. [REDACTED] was assigned to the JIDC from 18 October 2003 to present. [REDACTED] was unable to identify anyone depicted in the photographs.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[REDACTED]
Investigating Officer

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AG0000522

DOD 000610

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2961; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Metro Park, Springfield, VA
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/05/23
3. TIME: 1359
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
6. SSN
7. GRADE/STATUS: E-5/USA
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 500th Military intelligence Group, Camp Zama, Japan

9. I WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
I arrived at Abu Ghraib circa 18/19 October 2003 and am currently assigned there. During this period (18 Oct 2003 - 22 May 2004) I took rest and relaxation leave from 5-20 April 2004. From 18 October 2003 to 5 April 2004 I was assigned as an interrogator in the Detainee Assessment Branch (DAB) My duty in the DAB was as an interrogator. We served as the last part of the interrogation process, conducting reviews of detainee interrogation files to evaluate detainees for release or continued interrogation. As part of our review we would conduct detainee interviews as a final "check" before making a recommendation. Unlike interrogations, our interviews consisted of direct questioning. If a detainee was uncooperative he would not receive a recommendation for release. Upon my return from leave circa 20 April 2004, until present, I was reassigned to the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) to conduct detainee interrogations. I am a trained interrogator (97E); my military occupational specialty for the past four years. Since my arrival in Abu Ghraib I received no formal training on local interrogation methods/policies, interrogation rules of engagement (IROE) or proper detainee treatment. I do not recall receiving any training in Abu Ghraib on the Geneva Conventions. I did receive a listing of IROE shortly after my arrival which I was asked to review and sign a statement acknowledging I read and understood them. I was not provided any additional clarification on the IROEs. I fully understood the IROE and that detainees should be treated humanely. While assigned in the DAB I observed one incident where I believe an interrogation technique was inappropriate. I was teamed with a civilian CACI employee, [redacted]. As a team, [redacted] and I took turns serving as the primary interrogator and observer. I don't recall his last name or any additional details regarding [redacted] arrived at the DAB circa December/January 2003 and was partnered with me. I only worked with him for 2-3 days until he was reassigned to another interrogator in the DAB and the following week [redacted] departed Abu Ghraib. I believe that [redacted] first arrived in Abu Ghraib circa July 2003 and was assigned to the Joint Interrogation Detention Center (JIDC) as an interrogation screener before being moved to the DAB. During my second or third day of working with [redacted] HE was conducting an interrogation and I was observing. I observed [redacted] grab a detainee on the shoulder to move him within the interrogation cell. While his action did not harm the detainee it concerned me as I had been trained it is inappropriate to touch a detainee. At the conclusion of the interrogation I raised my concern with [redacted] however, he had a strong character, didn't believe I had any supervisory role over him, and didn't listen. While I can't recall his exact words, [redacted] told me something to the effect that if I was a real American I wouldn't think his action was inappropriate. I subsequently reported his touching of the detainee to my chain of command [redacted] NCOIC, DAB [redacted] OIC, DAB) which I believe resulted in HIS movement to a new partner the following day and his departure from Abu Ghraib the following week; however I can't be certain. [redacted] had me prepare a statement and she prepared one herself documenting our conversation regarding [redacted]. Both statements were provided to [redacted]. I was later told by [redacted] that [redacted] had been counseled and the IROE explained to HIM; however, HE still did not agree his actions were inappropriate. I don't know if our statements were sent forward from [redacted]. I believe, but am not certain, that both [redacted] reported to [redacted]. Other than the one incident with [redacted] I never observed improper treatment or photos of detainees. I did overhear conversations of abusive behavior toward some detainees. Principally this occurred in a break area where CACI employees often congregated. I was not part of these conversations and do not recall who I overheard discussing the abuse or the specifics of any incident. It was general conversation which I recall concerned harsh physical treatment (beating, placing in uncomfortable positions). I have no knowledge of MI encouraging MPs to "soften up detainees."
Q: Do you have anything else to add to this statement?
A: No.

//////////////////////////////////////END OF STATEMENT//////////////////////////////////////

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT [redacted] DATED [redacted]
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Springfield, VA

DATED 2004/05/23

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing

follows
[REDACTED]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2/2, FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Oath)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 23rd day of May, 2004, at Metro Park, Springfield, VA

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT FROM [REDACTED]

1. Here is a verbatim copy of the sworn statement provided by [REDACTED] taken at 1325, 5 June 2004, at the US Army Detention Facility, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. I was not allowed to take a computer into the detention facility, therefore [REDACTED] prepared the sworn statement in his own handwriting. Following is verbatim, direct quote from the handwritten statement:

" 1. To the best of my recollection the individual in the BDD'us in the photo is [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 372nd MP 3rd PLT. Former Marine Corps, Inf. Normally assigned to convey escorts. He was a friend and former team member of [REDACTED] Always had is K-bar knife on him.

2. I heard from [REDACTED] that the death of the detainee was from integration from MI. She told me it was listed as a heart attack but she knew the is was something else.

3. [REDACTED] told me that MI and OGA said that they were to keep doing what they were doing to the detainees because they were talking faster than ever.

4. The night of trhe 7 detainees there was no one at the time I was there from MI. The photo that [REDACTED] showed me I did not know the no MP's that was there.

5. I did not see or to my knowledge know of MI taking photo, making detainees wear woman's underwear, abusing detainees, or use of dogs for interrogation. Other than paragraph 3 I don't know of MI telling the MP's to abuse or soften up the detainees.

6. I was assigned to the ABU Grahib around 1 Oct. 2003 to 4 Feb 2004. I went on leave from 9 Nov 2003 to 30 Nov 2003.

7. I was told that the MP's had to give the woman's underwear because that is all they had.

8. Referance to paragraph 2 [REDACTED] refence something else was the cause of death. Q. Did she tell you what is? A. She told me that he had been beaten.

9. Q. Is there anything else you wish to add. A. No."

[REDACTED]

GG 15

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Camp Britton Kuwait
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/06/25
3. TIME: 1325
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME:
6. SSN:
7. GRADE/STATUS: PVT/E-1
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 539 MP BN DET 5 Camp Britton Kuwait APO AE 09366

9. I WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. To the best of my recollection the individual in BDD's in the photo is [redacted] 372 ND MP 3rd PCT. Former Marine Corps, Inf. Normally assigned to convey escorts. He was a friend and former team member of [redacted] Always had a K-bar knife on him.
2. I heard from [redacted] that the death of the detainee was from interrogation from MI. She told me it was listed as a heart attack but she knew that it was something else. JCS
3. [redacted] told me that MI and OGA said that they were to keep doing what they were doing to the detainees because they WERE talking faster than ever. JCS
4. The night of the 7 detainees there was no one of the time I was there from MI. The photo that [redacted] showed me I did not know the no MPs that was there. JCS
5. I did not see or to my knowledge know of MI taking photos, making detainees wear women's underwear, abusing detainees, or use of dogs for interrogation, other than paragraph 3 I don't know of MI telling the MPs to abuse or soften up the detainees. JCS

Nothing follows [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT:
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

AG0000526

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

7. I was
woman's
had. JCS

al

8. Reference to paragraph 2 [REDACTED] reference something else
was the cause of Death. Q. Did she tell you what is?
A. She told me that he had been Beaten.

9. Q. Is there anything else you wish to add?
A. NO [REDACTED]

Nothing
Follows [REDACTED]

AFFIDAVIT

[REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [REDACTED]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 5 day of June 1984 at CA 303

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

5 USC 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES